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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifteen years, Japan has undertaken a number of
measures designed to increase opportunities for foreign suppliers
to participate in its government procurements. In 1980, Japan
joined the United States and other countries in instituting
international disciplines on government procurement in the
GATT Agreement on Government Procurement ("GATT
Code").' From 1980 to 1994, Japan entered thirteen bilateral
procurement agreements with the United States, covering six
sectors of Japanese government procurement.2 These agreements
were aimed at making the Japanese government procurement
system more fair, open, transparent, competitive, and accessible to
foreign suppliers.3  During that same period, the Japanese
government issued several action plans which contained similar
objectives.4  Most recently, Japan signed the World Trade
* Senior Counsel for Trade Agreements, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Washington D.C.; Adjunct Professor of Law ([apanese Law), The George
Washington University; member of Bars of District of Columbia and State of
Minnesota; B.A., South Dakota State University; J.D., University of Minnesota;
LL.M., University of Washington; Fulbright Fellowship at Tohoku University,
Sendai, Japan.
The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author, and do
not necessarily reflect those of any department or agency of the U.S.
Government.
All translations have been verified by the author and not by the University
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law.
' See Agreement on Government Procurement, GATT BISD, 26th Supp.
33, 33 (1980) [hereinafter GATT Code].
2 See Jean Heilman Grier, U.S.-Japan Government Procurement Agreements,
14 WiS. INT'L L.J. 1, 12-13 (1995).
3 See id. at 3.
4 See id. at 13.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
Organization's ("WTO") Agreement on Government Procurement
("GPA"), which was negotiated in the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
This Article examines the major changes in Japan's govern-
ment procurement system that were necessary to fulfill its GPA
obligations. This Article first sets forth the requirements of the
GPA. It then describes the measures that Japan has taken to
implement the GPA and their significance to Japan. Finally, this
Article focuses on the implementation of international disciplines
by sub-central governments and the establishment of a complaint
mechanism.
2. WTO AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
2.1. Overview
Participating governments concluded the multilateral negotia-
tions to revise the GATT Code6 on December 15, 1993 with a
new Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).7 These
parties signed the GPA on April 15, 1994.8 Unlike most WTO
' See Agreement on Government Procurement, reprinted in MESSAGE FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE URUGUAY
ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS, IMPLEMENTING BILL,
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION, AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING
STATEMENTS, H.R. DOG. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1719 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter GPA].
6 The GATT Code entered into force on January 1, 1981, after it was
negotiated during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. See
Report (1981) of the Committee on Government Procurement, GATT BISD
28th Supp. 38, 38 (1982); The Uruguay Round Agreements Act: Statement of
Administrative Action, Agreement on Government Procurement, reprinted in
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE
URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS, IMPLE-
MENTING BILL, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION, AND REQUIRED
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R. DOc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d. Sess. 656,
1037 [hereinafter UR-SAA]. The GATT Code required the signatories to
provide non-discriminatory treatment to the products and suppliers of other
signatories. See GATT Code, supra note 1, art. II. The GATT Code also
obligated its signatories to use fair, transparent, and non-discriminatory proce-
dures in procurements by central government entities. See id. art. V.
7 Signatories to the GPA include GATT Code members (Austria, Canada,
the member states of the European Union, Finland, Israel, Japan, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States) plus one new member, the
Republic of Korea. See UR-SAA, supra note 6, at 1037-38.
1 See id. at 656.
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agreements,9 the GPA is a plurilateral trade agreement that
applies only between the WTO members that agree to adhere to
it. °
The GPA represents a substantial improvement over the
GATT Code because it expands the scope of coverage and imposes
stricter procedural disciplines on the signatories." It opens an
estimated $350 billion annually in government contracts to
international bidding, an approximate tenfold increase over the
contracts subject to the GATT Code. 2 In addition, international
procurement rules designed to ensure fair, open, and competitive
procurements are expected to promote trade among signatories,
reduce trade disputes, and lead to budgetary savings and higher
quality procurements. 3 The following sections of this Article
describe the components of the GPA.
2.2. Scope and Coverage of the GPA
Like the GATT Code, the GPA applies to procurements of
goods by central government entities, as well as certain quasi-
governmental entities.' 4  The GPA, however, goes beyond the
GATT Code because it governs the government procurement of
services and also procurements by sub-central governments.
The application of the GPA to a specific procurement depends
upon three factors: (1) the type of procurement; (2) the entity
conducting the procurement; and (3) the value of the purchase.
Each of these factors is considered briefly below.
9 Each country that accepted WTO membership automatically became a
party to eighteen agreements and legal instruments, referred to as "multilateral
trade agreements." Id. at 660.
10 See id. The three other plurilateral agreements are the Agreement on
Trade in Civil Aircraft, the Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat, and the
International Dairy Arrangement. If all WTO members agree, the parties may
add more plurilateral agreements. See id.
" See id, at 1037; Gerard de Graaf & Matthew King, Towards a More Global
Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GA7T Government
Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round, 29 INT'L LAW.
435, 437 (1995).
12 See de Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 435-36.
13 See id, at 437.
14 See UR-SAA, supra note 6, at 1037.
15 See id.
19961
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2.2.1. Type of Procurement
Like the GATT Code, the GPA covers the procurement of
goods. The GPA goes further, however, and for the first time
brings the procurement of services under international disci-
pline.16 Due to disagreements among the signatories as to the
common services they should cover, services covered by the GPA
vary by country. The signatories instead sought comparable
coverage on a reciprocal basis through bilateral negotiations.
17
Each signatory, except for the United States, 8 developed a list of
services that they will subject to GPA disciplines.' 9 Only when
both the government of the procuring entity and the government
of the supplier have agreed to cover a particular service will the
procurement of that service be subject to GPA disciplines.2°
Each signatory also negotiated the exclusion of certain procure-
ments from GPA obligations.2
2.2.2. Entity Coverage
Each signatory applies the GPA to all central government
entities, the executive branch in particular, subject to limited
exceptions.22 Although the negotiators of the GPA drafted it to
cover sub-central entities and government-related entities, such as
utilities, the signatories negotiated the coverage of specific entities
on the basis of reciprocity.' For example, the European Un-
16 See id.
17 See de Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 447.
18 Rather than using a positive list, the United States listed the services that
it is excluding from GPA coverage. See GPA, supra note 5, app. I, at 1998
(United States Annex 4: Services).
19 See de Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 447. The United States, the
European Union (EU), and European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) countries
covered financial services, but Japan did not. As a result, those countries are
"not obliged to grant access to financial services contracts to Japanese [financial]
service providers." Id.
20 See id.
21 See UR-SAA, supra note 6, at 1039. The United States has carried
forward the exclusions in its schedule to the GATT Code to the GPA. See id.
at 103940.
2 See id. at 1037-38.
23 See id. at 1038; de Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 446.
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ion24 and the European Free Trade Agreement' countries
included all of their sub-central entities, while Japan and South
Korea offered only their major sub-central entities." Each
country lists its covered entities in its schedules to the GPAY
2.2.3. Thresholds
The GPA does not apply to every procurement of the covered
entities. Coverage depends upon whether the value of the
procurement is above the GPA threshold.2' This threshold
differs depending on the type of procurement and the level of
government making the purchase. 29  All signatories of the GPA
apply the same thresholds to procurements by central government
entities: (1) 130,000 Special Drawing Rights ("SDRs")31 ($182,-
000) for procurements of goods and services; and (2) 5,000,000
24 On April 15, 1994, the date of the signing of the GPA, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxem-
bourg, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom comprised the EU. See de
Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 435 n.2. Thiee EFTA countries, Austria,
Finland, and Sweden, joined the EU on January 1, 1995. See id.
25 When the GPA was negotiated, the EFTA countries were Austria,
Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Switzerland. See id. at 435 n.3. Switzerland did
not offer all of its sub-central entities, only the first tier. See UR-SAA, supra
note 6, at 1968-69.
26 See de Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 446. The Japanese and Korean
sub-central entities are prefectures or provinces and cities with populations of
more than 500,000. See id. The United States offered to cover procurements
by specified government entities in 37 states, federally-owned- utilities and
several sub-central utilities, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
the Port of Baltimore, and the New York Power Authority. See UR-SAA,
supra note 6, at 1038.
2' See UR-SAA, supra note 6, at 1038. Annex 1 of the GPA lists central
government entities, Annex 2 lists sub-central government entities, and Annex
3 lists government-related entities. See GPA, supra note 5, at 1984-97.
28 See UR-SAA, supra note 6, at 1039. The GPA elaborates on provisions
in the GATT Code regarding the valuation of contracts to determine whether
the GPA covers a procurement. GATT Code, supra note 1, art. I(1)(b); GPA,
supra note 5, art. II; de Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 438.
29 See de Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 438.
30 Special Drawing Rights "are the International Monetary Fund's interna-
tional reserve unit of account and are based on the currencies of five countries."
2 NANCY E. MORGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE TOKYO ROUND
TRADE AGREEMENTS: GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 2 n.2 (1981). In 1994,
one SDR equaled approximately $1.40. See UR-SAA, supra note 6, at 1039.
While the value of the SDR is recalculated every two years, the dollar figures
used in this Article are based on the 1994 SDR value.
1996]
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SDRs ($7,000,000) for procurements of construction services.31
Thresholds for procurements by sub-central governments and
government-related entities, however, vary by country. Sub-
central governments apply thresholds of: (1) 200,000 SDRs
($280,000) for goods and services, except for the United States and
Canada, which apply a 355,000 SDR ($500,000) threshold; and (2)
5,000,000 SDRs ($7,000,000) for construction services, except for
Japan and Korea, which use a 15,000,000 SDR ($21,000,000)
threshold.32
Government-related enterprises follow GPA requirements for
procurements of goods and services above a threshold of 400,000
SDRs ($560,000), except for the United States which uses a
$250,000 threshold for federally-owned utilities.33 When govern-
ment-owned entities purchase construction services, they must
follow the GPA for procurements valued at 5,000,000 SDRs or
more, except for Japan and Korea, which use the same threshold
as for sub-central construction services (15,000,000 SDRs).
34
2.3. General Disciplines
2.3.1. National Treatment and Most-Favored-Nation
Treatment
Consistent with fundamental GATT principles, the GPA calls
for national treatment, which prescribes that foreign goods,
services, and suppliers be treated no less favorably than their
domestic counterparts.35  The GPA further calls for most-
favored-nation ("MFN") treatment, which requires a signatory to
give the best treatment that it accords to any GPA signatory to all
GPA parties.36 While these obligations apply to most procure-
31 See UR-SAA, supra note 6, at 1039.
3' See id.
33 See id. This was the threshold that applied to the entities under the
North American Free Trade Agreement. See North American Free Trade
Agreement, art. 1001(1)(c)(ii), reprinted in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT, IMPLEMENTING BILL, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R. Doc. No. 159, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 713 (1993).
34 See id.
31 See GPA, supra note 5, art. I(1)(a).
36 See id. art. m(1)(b).
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ments of goods and services by central government entities,3 7 the
parties departed from MFN treatment for purchases of sub-central
and government-related entities based on their reciprocal approach
to coverage.38
Signatories to the GPA must ensure that their entities do not
treat a locally established supplier in a less favorable manner than
another locally established supplier "on the basis of degree of
foreign affiliation or ownership."39 In addition, each GPA party
must ensure that their entities do not discriminate against locally
established suppliers on the basis of the country of production of
the goods or services that they supply.4°
2.3.2. Offsets
In a significant improvement over the GATT Code, the GPA
prohibits government entities from considering, seeking, or
imposing "offsets," such as local content or investment require-
ments, in the qualification and selection of suppliers, goods, and
services or in the evaluation of tenders and award of contracts.41
Only one country, Israel, negotiated an offsets exception.42
2.4. Procedural Requirements
In addition to expanding coverage, the GPA improved upon
GATT Code procedures. The GPA details requirements for
technical specifications; 43 qualifications of suppliers; 44 the publi-
cation of invitations to participate in procurements; 45 selection
17 Only a few exceptions or differences in treatment were taken. For
example, the United States will not apply the GPA disciplines to the National
Aeronautical and Space Administration ("NASA") for bids by Japanese
suppliers since Japan refused to cover its National Space Development Agency.
See UR-SAA, supra note 6, at 1038; de Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 446
n.47.
3s See de Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 446.
39 GPA, supra note 5, art. I(2).
40 See id.
41 See id. art. XVI; UR-SAA, supra note 6, at 1041.
42 See UR-SAA, supra note 6, at 1041.
43 See GPA, supra note 5, art. VI.
4 See id. art. VIII.
41 See id. art. IX. The GPA also delineates the required content of the
notice. See id.
1996]
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procedures;4 time limits for tendering and delivery;47 the provi-
sion of tender documentation;48 the submission, receipt and
opening of tenders and awarding of contracts;49 negotiations;'
limited tendering;"1 transparency;12 and challenge procedures. 3
Drafters of the GPA incorporated provisions from the GATT
Code, often with only slight modifications. GPA procedural
obligations, however, diverge in several respects from the GATT
Code, in part to accommodate new areas of coverage and to
provide for greater procurement efficiency~m The following
discussion of the GPA requirements notes several of the more
important differences between the GPA and the GATT Code.
2.4.1. Tendering Procedures
As with the GATT Code, the GPA provides for three types
of tendering: (1) open tendering procedures under which all
interested suppliers may submit a tender; (2) selective tendering
procedures, which allow only suppliers invited by the entity to
submit a tender; and (3) limited tendering, known as single
tendering under the GATT Code, whereby the entity contacts
suppliers individually under specified conditions.5
The GPA decrees as "the rule" the use of open and selective
tendering procedures.5" When a procuring entity uses a selective
tendering procedure, it must "ensure optimum effective interna-
tional competition" by maximizing the number of domestic and
46 See id. art. X.
47 See id. art. XI.
41 See id. art. XII.
49 See id. art. XmH.
50 See id. art. XIV.
51 See id. art. XV.
52 See id. art. XVI.
51 See id. art. XX.
51 See UR-SAA, supra note 6, at 1041. For example, the GPA subjects sub-
central and government-related entities to less rigorous notice and publication
requirements than those of central government entities. See GPA, supra note
5, art. XIX(5). It also imposes less stringent statistical reporting requirements
on sub-central and government-related entities. See id.
55 See GPA, supra note 5, art. VII(3); GATT Code, supra note 1, art. V(1);
de Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 439 n.23.
56 de Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 439; see also GPA, supra note 5, art.
X(1).
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foreign suppliers that it invites to submit tenders.5 7 The entity
must also select suppliers "to participate in a fair and non-
discriminatory manner.""8 Entities may use limited tendering
procedures only in specified situations. These circumstances
include: (1) where no tenders are received when open or selective
tendering procedures are used;59 (2) where works of art or
prototypes are procured;60 (3) cases of extreme urgency;61 (4)
cases for additional deliveries of a product that has already been
supplied;62 and (5) certain other "cases that would not damage
international competition. "63
2.4.2. Technical Specifications
With respect to technical specifications, both the GPA and the
GATT Code stipulate that the technical specifications of a product
or service to be procured must be based on performance rather
than design characteristics." Unlike the GATT Code, however,
the GPA explicitly prefers the use of international standards over
national standards in the development of technical specifica-
tions.65 Furthermore, the GPA prohibits procuring entities from
seeking or accepting advice in the preparation of specifications
from a supplier that may have a commercial interest in the
procurement, if such advice would impede competition. *6
"7 GPA, supra note 5, art. X(1).
59 Id.
5 See id. art. XV(1)(a).
o See id. art. XV(1)(b).
61 See id. art. XV(1)(c).
6 See id. art. XV(1)(d).
63 de Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 439.
Specifically, these cases concern (a) the purchase of construction
services that were not specified in the original contract or are repeat
construction services, (b procurements following a design contest that
has been organized in a manner fully consistent with the principles of
the GPA, (c) the purchase of products on a commodities market, or
(d) purchases made under exceptionally advantageous conditions that
will only arise in the very short term.
Id. at 439 n.24.
" See GPA, supra note 5, art. VI(2)(a); GATT Code, supra note 1, art.
IV(2)(a). The GATT Code only covered products.
65 See GPA, supra note 5, art. VI(2)(b); GATT Code, supra note 1, art.
IV(2)(b); de Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 438.
" See GPA, supra note 5, art. VI(4).
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2.4.3. Qualification of Suppliers
Like the GATT Code, the GPA allows entities to prescribe
qualifications for suppliers, subject to constraints that are designed
to ensure that all interested suppliers are given sufficient time and
opportunity to participate effectively in the qualification pro-
cess. 7 Entities are also prohibited from discriminating against
prospective suppliers on the grounds of nationality. 8
The GPA incorporates important new safeguards regarding the
qualification of suppliers, including a requirement that procuring
entities limit conditions for participation to those that are
"Cessential to ensure the firm's capability to fulfil the contract in
question."69 Under the GPA, procuring entities must consider a
supplier's global business activity as well as its activity within the
territory of the procuring entity in assessing the supplier's
financial, commercial, and technical capacity.70  To further
facilitate participation in procurements, GPA signatories must
ensure that the constituent parts of each procuring entity use a
single qualification procedure, unless there is a demonstrated need
for different procedures.
7 1
2.4.4. Information for Prospective Suppliers
GPA stipulations for furnishing suppliers with information on
pending procurements are more extensive than GATT Code
requirements. Both the GPA and the GATT Code require
67 See id. art. VIII(a); GATT Code, supra note 1, art. V(2); de Graaf &
King, supra note 11, at 439.
68 See GPA, supra note 5, art. VIII(b); GATT Code, supra note 1, art.
V(2)(b). The GPA elaborates on this prohibition:
[a]ny conditions for participation required from suppliers, including
financial guarantees, technicl qualifications and information necessary
for establishing the financial, commercial and technical capacity of
suppliers, as well as the verification of qualifications, shall be no less
favrourable to suppliers of other Parties than to domestic suppliers and
shall not discriminate among suppliers of other Parties.
GPA, supra note 5, art. VIII(b). The GATT Code includes virtually the same
prohibition. See GATT Code, supra note 1, art. V(2)(b).
69 GPA, supra note 5, art. VII(b).
70 See id.
71 See id. art. VIII(W)(i). Signatories are also obligated to minimize
differences in qualification procedures among their entities. See id. art.
VfI(g)(ii).
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procuring entities to publish notice in an official publication 2 of
intended procurements that are above certain thresholds, except
where limited tendering is used.73 Also, both agreements pre-
scribe that the procurement notices shall include: (1) the nature
and quantity of the procurement;7 4 (2) the type of procurement
procedures that will be used;7 (3) information on the qualifica-
tion process;7 6 (4) economic and technical requirements;' (5)
information on obtaining specifications and other documents;
7
(6) the delivery date;79 and (7) the amount and terms of pay-
ment."0 The GPA mandates that the content of the notice
include any options for further procurement" and a statement
of whether the entity is seeking offers for purchase, lease, or
rental.82 Entities must also publish a summary of the notices in
one of the official languages of the WTO."3
As noted above, the GPA includes relaxed notice and publica-
tion procedures for sub-central government entities and govern-
ment-related entities, allowing them to use simplified procedures
in the invitation to participate in a tender.8 4 For example, sub-
7 See id. art. IX(1). The journals in which the notices are published
include Japan's official gazette, the Kanp5. See id. app. II; UR-SAA, supra note
6, at 2014; de Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 438 n.16.
73 See GPA, supra note 5, art. IX(1); GATT Code, supra note 1, art. V(3).
' See GPA, supra note 5, art. IX(6)(a); GATT Code, supra note 1, art.
V(4)(a).
s See GPA, supra note 5, art. IX(6)(b) (parties must specify whether the
procedure is open or selective or will involve negotiation); GATT Code, supra
note 1, art. V(4)(b).
' See GPA, supra note 5, art. IX(6)(d); GATT Code, supra note 1, art.
V(4)(d).
77 See GPA, supra note 5, art. IX(6)(f); GATT Code, supra note 1, art.
V(4)(f0.
78 See GPA, supra note 5, art. IX(6)(e); GATT Code, supra note 1, art.
V(4)(e).
79 See GPA, supra note 5, art. IX(6)(c); GATT Code, supra note 1, art.
V(4)(c).
" See GPA, supra note 5, art. IX(6)(g); GATT Code, supra note 1, art.
V(4)(g).
8 See GPA, supra note 5, art. IX(6)(a).
82 See id. art. IX(6)(h).
83 See id. art. IX(8); GATT Code, supra note 1, art. V(4). The official
languages are English, French, and Spanish. See de Graaf & King, supra note
11, at 439 n.18.
84 See UR-SAA, supra note 6, at 1041.
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central entities and government-related entities may use either a
notice of planned procurement or a notice of a qualification
process as an invitation to participate in a procurement."5
The GPA and *the GATT Code both detail the minimum
contents of tender documentation and require that there be
sufficient information to enable suppliers to submit responsive
tenders.86 Procuring entities must also promptly respond to
reasonable requests for procurement information, so long as such
information does not give the supplier an advantage over its
competitors in the procurement. 7
2.4.5. Time Limits for Tendering and Delivery
The GPA changes several deadlines established in the GATT
Code. When an entity uses open tendering procedures, it
generally must allow suppliers a minimum of forty days to submit
tenders after it publishes the notice of procurement. 8 Where an
entity uses a selective tendering procedure and does not maintain
a permanent list of qualified suppliers, however, it must give
suppliers at least twenty-five days from the date of publication of
the notice to apply for an invitation to participate in the procure-
ment.8 9  Under the GPA, procuring entities may shorten the
time period in certain circumstances.9
2.4.6. Negotiations with Tenderers
A new provision in the GPA allows entities to conduct
negotiations with potential suppliers where either the entity has
indicated such intent in its notice of proposed procurement or,
based on the evaluation, it appears "that no one tender is
obviously the most advantageous in terms of the specific evalua-
tion criteria set forth in the notices or tender documentation." 91
s See GPA, supra note 5, art. DC(3).
86 See id. art. XIU(2); GATT Code, supra note 1, art. V(12).
87 See GPA, supra note 5, art. XII(3)(c); GATT Code, supra note 1, art.
V(13)(c).
'8 See GPA, supra note 5, art. XI(2)(a). Under the GATT Code, the
minimum time is 30 days. See GATT Code, supra note 1, art. V(10)(a).
89 See GPA, supra note 5, art. XI(2)(b). Under the GATT Code, the
minimum time is 30 days. See GATT Code, supra note 1, art. V(10)(b).
90 See GPA, supra note 5, art. XI(3)(a).
91 Id. art. XIV(1).
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The primary purpose of such negotiations is to enable the entity
to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the tenders.92 In
conducting the negotiations, entities are warned to treat tenders
in confidence93 and not to discriminate between suppliers.94
2.4.7 Award of Contracts
When awarding a contract under the GPA, entities must
follow the same methodology as under the GATT Code. They
must award the contract to the supplier who is "fully capable of
undertaking the contract" and who offers either the lowest price
or the most advantageous tender95 "based on various criteria such
as quality, technical merit, delivery costs, and price." 96 The GPA
adds the requirement that awards must be based on the criteria
and essential requirements specified in the tender documenta-
tion.
7
2.4.8. Post-Award Information
The GPA imposes a new obligation on entities to publish a
post-award notice within seventy-two days of the awarding of a
contract." Entities must include the following information in
the notice: (1) the nature and quantity of the procurement; 99 (2)
the name and address of the winning tenderer;' ° (3) "the value
of the winning award or the highest and lowest offer taken into
account in the award of the contract;"'1 (4) the type of proce-
dure used;'0 2 and (5) where limited tendering was used, the
92 See id. art. XIV(2).
93 See id. art. XIV(3).
94 See id. art. XIV(4). In particular, entities must: (1) follow criteria set out
in the notices and tender documentation in eliminating any participants; (2)
send modifications of criteria and technical requirements to all participants
remaining in the negotiations and afford them an opportunity to make new or
amended submissions; and (3) when the negotiations are concluded, allow all
participants to submit final tenders by a common deadline. See id.
9s Id. art. XII(4)(b); see GATT Code, supra note 1, art. V(14)(f).
96 de Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 439-40.
9 See GPA, supra note 5, art. XIII(4)(c).
9' See id. art. XVIII(1).
99 See id. art. XVIII(1)(a).
100 See id. art. XVII(1)(b).
101 Id. art. XVf(1)(e).
102 See id. art. XVIII(1)(g).
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justification for its use.1°3 Also, when requested by a supplier,
the entity must disclose: (1) relevant information as to why the
supplier's application for qualification was rejected; 14 (2) why
the supplier's tender was not selected; 05 (3) the name of the
winning tenderer; and (4) the distinguishing features and relative
advantages of the tender selected.'""
2.4.9. Bid Challenge Procedures
One of the most important improvements in the GPA is the
mandate that signatories set up a bid challenge system.07 For
the first time, the agreement obligates each signatory to "provide
non-discriminatory, timely, transparent and effective proce-
dures,"' 8 which will enable aggrieved suppliers to challenge
procurements that are allegedly conducted in contravention of the
GPA. GPA parties must provide for an independent assessment
of alleged violations of the GPA.' °9 Authority for this review
must be given to either a court or an impartial and independent
review body that has no interest in the outcome of the procure-
ment and that is made up of members who are secure from
external influence."0
When the reviewing body is not a court, its actions must be
subject to judicial review or it must have procedures that provide,
inter alia, that: (1) participants have the right to be heard,"' to
have access to and be represented in all proceedings, 12 and to
present witnesses;"1 (2) proceedings can take place in public;14
103 See id. art. XVM(1)(f).
104 See id. art. XVI(2)(b).
105 See id.
106 Id. art. XVMI(2)(c); see also GATT Code, supra note 1, art. VI(2). There
are several exceptions to the required disclosure under the GPA. See, GPA,
supra note 5, art. XVIf(4).
107 See GPA, supra note 5, art. XX(1). The GATT Code did not impose
any obligation on signatories to provide for bid challenges.
'0' Id. art. XX(2). Signatories must encourage suppliers that complain of
breaches of the GPA to seek resolution of the complaint with the procuring
entity. See id. art. XX(1).
109 See id. art. XX(6).
110 See id.
m See id. art. XX(6)(a).
112 See id. art. XX(6)(b)-(c).
113 See id. art. XX(6)(f.
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and (3) written opinions or decisions will be issued with a
statement of their basis.' If the reviewing body finds a breach
of the GPA, it must have the authority to order either a correc-
tion of the GPA violation or "compensation for the loss or
damages suffered, which may be limited to costs for tender
preparation or protest."" 6 Signatories must also provide "rapid
interim measures to correct breaches of the [GPA] and to preserve
commercial opportunities. "117 The new bid challenge systems
should contribute significantly to "improving domestic enforce-
ment of [GPA] obligations."11
2.5. Consultations and Dispute Settlement
The GPA requires signatories to settle their disputes related to
the GPA's implementation under the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU")." 9
The GPA, however, provides for several departures from DSU
procedures, including: (1) shortening the panel review period to
the extent possible;120 (2) allowing only GPA signatories to
participate in Dispute Settlement Body proceedings involving
GPA disputes;.2 . (3) requiring panels to include persons qualified
in government procurement; 1"  and (4) prohibiting cross-
retaliation.at )
11 See id. art. XX(6)(d).
"I See id. art. XX(6)(e).
116 Id. art. XX(7)(c). Japan, the European Union, and EFTA had advocated
limiting recoverable damages to bid-preparation costs. See de Graaf & King,
supra note 11, at 440 n.29.
117 GPA, supra note 5, art. XX(7)(a). "Such action may result in suspension
of the procurement process." Id. The GPA also provides that "overriding
adverse consequences for the interests concerned, including the public interest,
may be taken into account in deciding whether such measures should be
applied," and where they are not applied, written justification must be
provided. Id.
11. UR-SAA, supra note 6, at 1041.
19 See GPA, supra note 5, art. XXI(1).
120 See id. art. XXII(6).
12 See id. art. XXII(3).
12 See id. art. XXJI(5).
12. See id. art. XXII(3). DSU procedures allow cross-retaliation if a party
can show that retaliation in the same area would not be effective. Understand-
ing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art.
22(3)(1), reprinted in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING THE URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, TEXTS OF
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2.6. Implementation of the GPA
The GPA was signed on April 15, 1994,124 and all of the
signatories were obligated to implement it by January 1, 1996,1
25
with one exception.1 26
3. JAPAN'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GPA
3.1. Background
When Japan implemented the GPA on January 1, 1996," it
undertook its third set of international obligations to improve its
government procurement system. To understand the implications
of the new commitments for Japan, it is necessary to consider the
extent to which Japan had already reformed its procurement
system as a result of outside influences.
Before Japan became a signatory to the GATT Code, it made
relatively little use of an open competitive bidding system in
government procurements. 28 As a consequence, when Japan
implemented the Code in 1981, it instituted unprecedented
changes in its procurement system as it opened government
purchases to foreign suppliers. 129 The reform of Japan's procure-
ment system, however, did not end with its assumption of GATT
AGREEMENTS, IMPLEMENTING BILL, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION, AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R. Doc. No. 316,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1654 (1994).
124 See GPA, supra note 5, at 1719.
125 See id. art. XXIV(1).
126 The exception is the Republic of Korea, which was granted an additional
year, until January 1, 1997, to implement the GPA. See id. art. XXIV(3)(a).
Korea had not been a member of the GATT Code. See supra note 7.
127In eceber199, te Jpanese Diet app roved the Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, which included the GPA in Annex 4, and
a related package of seven bills. See Japan Economic Institute, Japan's Uruguay
Round Package, JEI Report No. 47B (Dec. 16, 1994) 12. The Lower House ap-
proved the package on December 2, 1994, and the Upper House on December
9, 1994. See id. Cabinet ratification of the package soon followed. See id.
Under Article 65 of the Japanese Constitution, "executive powers are vested in
the Cabinet." MITsuo MATSUSHIrrA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CoMPETL-
TION LAW IN JAPAN 6 (1993).
128 See Grier, supra note 2, at 10.
12 See id. at 12. For a thorough discussion of Japan's response to its
GATT Code responsibilities, see Kozo Toyama et al., Government Procurement
Procedures offapan, 21 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 91 (1987).
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Code obligations. Japan subsequently entered into a series of
bilateral arrangements with the United States and issued several
unilateral action plans in order to further reform its procurement
system.
130
Between 1980 and 1994, the United States and Japan negotiated
thirteen bilateral government procurement agreements."' With
the negotiation of these agreements, the United States sought to
remove impediments faced by foreign suppliers in specific
procurement areas. 32  The resulting agreements required the
Japanese government and certain government-related entities to
adopt more transparent, competitive, and non-discriminatory
procurement procedures.133
While each bilateral agreement was tailored to remove the
obstacles encountered by foreign suppliers in a particular sector,
the separate agreements have several common characteristics.
Each sets out procedures that generally are more detailed than
those required by the GATT Code. The agreements, for the most
part, supplement or fill "gaps" in the GATT Code1 4 by cover-
ing procurements not subject to multilateral disciplines, providing
more detailed procedures, and addressing specific market access
barriers posed by Japan's procurement system.35 Each agree-
ment applies only to procurements that meet certain thresholds
and are conducted by specified central government and quasi-
governmental entities.136 These Japanese entities closely corre-
spond to the entities subject to the GATT Code and the
GPAY'3 Japan accords the benefits of the bilateral agreements
130 See Grier, supra note 2, at 12-13.
131 For a comprehensive explanation of each of the 13 bilateral agreements,
see id at 18-61. The six sectors covered by these agreements are supercomput-
ers, public works, satellites, computers, medical technology, and telecommunica-
tions. See id.
132 See id. at 62.
133 See id. at 62-63.
13 See id. at 62. In the negotiation of the bilateral agreements, Japan's
compliance with the GATT Code was not at issue. Despite the criticisms of
Japan's procurement system, there have been no formal complaints regarding
its compliance with the GATT Code.
135 See id. at 62-63.
136 See id. at 18-61.
131 Some agreements were limited to a single entity or specified projects.
See id.
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to all foreign suppliers, not just those from the United States. 38
An example of an agreement negotiated to compensate for
limitations in GATT Code coverage is the first bilaterally
negotiated agreement, which applies to procurements by Japan's
domestic telecommunications carrier, Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone Corporation ("NTT").'" The United States had
sought a bilateral agreement to open NTT's purchases of public
telecommunications equipment to foreign suppliers because the
United States believed that Japan's GATT Code coverage was
inadequate.' 40 Other bilateral agreements cover services that
were not subject to the GATT Code, in particular construction
services. 141
In addition to the bilateral accords, Japan, on its own
initiative, but at least partially in response to foreign criticism of
its procurement system, adopted several action plans that
augmented its international commitments.'42  For example,
Japan improved on its GATT Code obligations by voluntarily
adding entities that would follow GATT Code requirements,
increasing the period between the publication of notices of
procurement and the deadline for the submission of tenders, and
lowering the threshold for procurements announced in the Kanp6,
Japan's official gazette.
43
3.2. Japans GPA Obligations
3.2.1. Japanese Entities Subject to the GPA
Like all GPA signatories, Japan subjected three categories of
entities to GPA disciplines: central government entities, sub-
central entities, and government-related entities. This Article
describes the specifics of the coverages below.
13 See id. at 63. The agreements did not impose reciprocal obligations on
the United States. See id.
139 See id. at 18-21.
140 See id. at 19.
141 See id. at 3245, 62.
142 See id. at 24 (1985 Japanese Action Program), 49 (1991 Japanese Action
Program), 53 (1994 Action Program on Government Procurement).
141 See id. at 24 (1985 Japanese Action Program), 49 (1991 Japanese Action
Program).
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3.2.1.1. Central Government Entities
Consistent with its coverage under the GATT Code, Japan
applies the GPA to the procurement of all central government
entities.1 " These entities include both houses of the Diet
(Japan's legislative body), the Supreme Court, the Cabinet, twelve
ministries, and fifteen other central government entities that are
subject to the Accounts Law.145 Japan, however, withheld its
National Space Development Agency from GPA coverage,
146
and has taken a few other exceptions, including contracts awarded
to cooperatives or associations.1 47 Japan applies the same thresh-
olds for central government procurements as the other signatories:
130,000 SDRs for goods; 4,500,000 SDRs for construction services;
450,000 SDRs for architectural, engineering, and technical services;
and 130,000 SDRs for other services.14 1
3.2.1.2. Sub-Central Entities
Second, in a major departure from its prior practice, 149 Japan
has subjected its most important sub-central governmental entities
to GPA disciplines.'5° Japan has required its forty-seven prefec-
'" See GPA, supra note 5, app. I, at 1900 Gapan Annex 1: Central
Government Entities Which Procure in Accordance with the Provisions of This
Agreement) [hereinafter Japan Annex 1]; see also GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN,
1995 REPORT ON THE WTO: CONSISTENCY OF TRADE POLICIES BY MAJOR
TRADiNG PARTNERS tbl. 2-6-1 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 GOJ REPORT].
145 See Japan Annex 1, supra note 144, at 1900. In addition, "internal sub-
divisions, independent organs, attached organizations, and other organizations
and local branch offices" of the central government entities must comply with
the GPA. Id. at 1901 n.1. The Accounts Law is Japan's basic procurement
statute, which "governs the overall aspects of budgeting, auditing, and
accounting by the National Government." Toyama et al., supra note 129, at
93; see Kaikei H6 [Accounts Law] (Law No. 35 of 1947) [hereinafter Accounts
Law].
i46 Because Japan refused to cover its National Space Development Agency,
the United States did not cover NASA with regard to Japan. See UR-SAA,
supra note 6, at 1038.
147 Japan Annex 1, supra note 144, at 1901 nn.2-4. Japan has limited
Defense Agency coverage to specified categories of procurements. See id. at
1901 n.4.
4s See id. at 1900.
149 Sub-central entities were not subject to the GATT Code.
150 See GPA, supra note 5, app. I, at 1903 Gapan Annex 2: Sub-Central
Government Entities Which Procure in Accordance with the Provisions of This
Agreement) [hereinafter Japan Annex 2]. As in the case of the central entities,
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tures and twelve designated cities... (shitei toshi) to comply with
the GPA, subject to several exceptions.152 The excepted procure-
ments include: contracts awarded to cooperatives and associa-
tions;"3 contracts awarded as part of entities' "daily profit-
making activities which are exposed to competitive forces in
markets;"" and "[p]rocurement related to the production,
transport or distribution of electricity."' Japan negotiated
GPA thresholds for its sub-central government procurements of
200,000 SDRs for goods and all services, except for construction
services and architectural, engineering, and technical services,
-which have thresholds of 15,000,000 SDRs and 1,500,000 SDRs,
respectively.1
56
3.2.1.3. Government-Related Entities
Japan has included eighty-four government-related entities in
the third category of entities subject to the GPA.'17  These
include the partially privatized NTT, several railway companies
created after the breakup of Japan National Railways Corporation,
the Japan External Trade Organization, and various financial
corporations, such as the Housing Loan Corporation." 8 Japan
the GPA obligations extend to "all internal sub-divisions, attached organizations
and branch offices of all their governors or mayors, committees and other
organizations provided for in the Local Autonomy Law." Id. at 1904 n.1. See
also 1995 GOJ REPORT, supra note 144, tbl. 2-6-1. See infra notes 182-281 and
accompanying text for discussion of extension of international disciplines to
local governments in Japan.
151 See Japan Annex 2, supra note 150, at 1904. Designated cities are cities
with populations over 500,000. See Chih6 Jichi H6 (Law No. 67 of 1947, as
amended) [hereinafter Local Autonomy Law]. The cities subject to the GPA
are: Osaka, Nagoya, Kyoto, Yokohama, Kobe, Kitakyushu, Sapporo, Kawasaki,
Fukuoka, Hiroshima, Sendai, and Chiba. See Japan Annex 2, supra note 150,
at 1903. Tokyo is classified as a prefectural government. See i.
152 See Japan Annex 2, supra note 150, at 1904.
153 See id. at 1904 n.3.
54 Id. at 1904 n.4. Entities may not use this exception to circumvent the
GPA. See id.
155 Id. at 1904 n.6. Japan did not open its electricity and public transport
utilities to international bidding. See de Graaf & King, supra note 11, at 447.
156 See Japan Annex 2, supra, note 150, at 1903.
157 See GPA, supra note 5, app. I, at 1905 (Japan Annex 3: All Other
Entities Which Procure in Accordance with the Provisions of This Agreement)
[hereinafter Japan Annex 3]; 1995 GOJ REPORT, supra note 144, tbl. 2-6-1.
15' See Japan Annex 3, supra note 157, at 1905-07.
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has also taken several general exceptions for its government-related
entities, similar to those taken for central and sub-central entities.
These exceptions from the GPA include contracts awarded to
cooperatives and associations and contracts for "daily profit-
making activities."159 In contrast to the other categories, Japan
has also exempted certain procurements of specific government-
related entities"W For example, NTT's procurement of public
electrical telecommunications equipment remains outside the
GPA.161
The thresholds that apply to procurements of Japanese govern-
ment-related entities are equivalent to the thresholds for central
government entities.6 2  An exception exists for construction
services, which have the same threshold as sub-central entities,
15,000,000 SDRs.163
3.2.1.4. Coverage Relative to the United States
When the GPA signatories concluded their negotiations, the
United States and Japan had reached only partial agreement on
bilateral coverage. The United States and Japan had agreed on the
coverage of central government procurements and services,
including construction services, but they had not reached
agreement on sub-central government entities and government-
related entities!" 4 On January 23, 1996, however, the two
nations finalized their coverage negotiations, and agreed to extend
bilateral access to their sub-central and government-related entities
at the thresholds set out in their respective annexes, effective
February 25, 1996.165
159 Id. at 1907.
160 See id. at 1907-08 n.4.
161 See id. at 1908 n.4(o. This category of NTT procurement, while exempt
from the GPA, is covered by the bilateral NTT Agreement. See Grier, supra
note 2, at 20-21.
162 See supra note 148 and accompanying text; see also Japan Annex 3, supra
note 157, at 1905.
163 See Japan Annex 3, supra note 157, at 1906.
164 See USTR, 1994 NATIoNAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS 154 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 NTE REPORT]. The primary
reason the United States and Japan had not reached an agreement was Japan's
insistence on applying a threshold for construction services that was three times
higher than that agreed upon by other signatories. See id.
161 See Letter from Dorothy Dwoskin, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative
for WTO and Multilateral Affairs, to Yoichi Suzuki, Director, First Interna-
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3.2.2. Japanese Service Procurements Subject to the GPA
The services that Japan has brought under GPA disciplines
include vehicle repair and maintenance, air transport services,
courier services, telecommunications services, computer and
related services, public works, and publishing and printing
services.166 These services, including several construction servic-
es, 167 are subject to several exclusions.
168
3.3. Incorporation of the GPA into Japanese Law
The legal regime that governs Japan's procurement system is
comprised of a basic procurement statute, the Accounts Law,169
as well as cabinet orders, ministerial ordinances, and internal
circulars °70  After signing the GATT Code, Japan had to
modify significantly its legal framework to conform it to the
country's new international obligations.17 1  Surprisingly, howev-
tional Organizations Division, Economic Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Government of Japan Glan. 23, 1996) [hereinafter Letter from Dorothy
Dwoskin] (copy on file with author); Letter from Yoichi Suzuki, Director, First
International Organizations Division, Economic Affairs Bureau, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, to Dorothy Dwoskin, Assistant U.S.
Trade Representative for WTO and Multilateral Affairs Glan. 23, 1996)
[hereinafter Letter from Yoichi Suzuki] (copy on file with author). Both the
United States and Japan extended coverage to the other country by amending
their respective "General Notes" in Appendix I of the GPA. See Letter from
Dorothy Dwoskin, supra, Attachment I: Modifications to the U.S. General
Notes in Appendix I, WTO Government Procurement Agreement (stating that
the United States withheld the benefits of the GPA from Japan for procure-
ments by Annex 3 entities "responsible for the generation or distribution of
electricity"); Letter from Yoichi Suzuki, supra, Attachment II: Modifications to
Japan's General Notes in Appendix I, WTO Agreement on Government
Procurement.
166 See GPA, supra note 5, app. I, at 1909 Japan Annex 4: Services).
167 See id. at 1910 n.3.
161 See id. at 1910. For example, letters are not included in the covered
courier services. See id. at 1910 n.2.
169 The Accounts Law provides the legal authority for cabinet orders,
which set out the details of procurement regulations. See Accounts Law, supra
note 145, art. 50.
170 For a detailed discussion of Japanese government procurement proce-
dures, see Toyama et al., supra note 129, at 93-96 and Grier, supra note 2, at 4-
10.
171 See Toyama et al., supra note 129, at 97-112; MATSUSH1TA, supra note
127, at 196.
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er, Japan did not need to amend its "most relevant authority," the
Accounts Law, because the statute did not depart from the
principle of national treatment for foreign suppliers.72 Instead,
Japan was able to incorporate the GATT Code through the
modification and adoption of Cabinet orders, ministerial ordinanc-
es, and other administrative measures. 3
Japan undertook similar measures to incorporate GPA
disciplines into its legal framework.17 4 Japan, however, had to
make fewer changes to meet the GPA requirements than when it
implemented the GATT Code. Predictably, in light of its GATT
experience, Japan did not need to amend its Accounts Law. As
with the GATT Code implementation, Japan was able to fulfill its
new international responsibilities through the revision of cabinet
orders, ministerial ordinances and other administrative actions as
described below.
To provide for central government implementation of the
GPA, the Cabinet revised three orders: (1) the Cabinet Order
Concerning Budgeting, Auditing, and Accounting (Yosan, Kessan
oyobi Kaikei Re); 75 (2) the Special Provisions for Cabinet Order
Concerning Budgeting, Auditing, and Accounting (Yosan, Kessan
oyobi Kaikei Rei Rinji Tokure); 6 and (3) the Cabinet Order
Stipulating Special Procedures for Government Procurement of
Goods and Specified Services (Kuni no Buppin t6 matawa Tokutei
Ekimu no Chotatsu Tetsuzuki no Tokurei o Sadameru Seirei).'77
In addition, the Ministry of Finance ("MOF") revised the
Ministerial Ordinance Stipulating Special Procedures for Govern-
ment Procurement of Goods and Specified Services (Kuni no
Buppin t6 matawa Tokutei Ekimu no Chotatsu Tetsuzuki no Tokurei
o Sadameru Sh6rei) that it had issued in 1980 as part of the
172 Toyama et al., supra note 129, at 93-94. The Accounts Law is typical
of Japanese laws in the general nature of its provisions and its delegation of the
responsibility for detailed regulations to cabinet orders and ministerial
ordinances. See id. at 93. This approach allows the cabinet and ministries
considerable discretion in implementing laws. See id.
173 See id. at 94-96.
'74 See infra notes 175-181, 193-198, and 295-297 and accompanying text.
175 Imperial Edict No. 165 of 1947, as amended by Cabinet Order No. 359
of 1995 [hereinafter Cabinet Accounting Order].
176 Imperial Edict No. 558 of 1946, as amended by Cabinet Order No. 359
of 1995.
1"7 Cabinet Order No. 300 of 1980, as amended by Cabinet Order No. 368
of 1995.
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implementation of the GATT Code.17 ' The MOF also modified
Regulations Concerning Management of Government Contracts
(Keiyaku Jimu Toriatsukai Kisoku).7 9  The central government
also undertook several measures to obtain local government
compliance with the GPA. is° Finally, the Japanese government
established a complaint mechanism."8 1
The effects of the GPA on Japan's government procurement
system are most prominent in two areas: (1) the application of
GPA disciplines to local government entities; and (2) the establish-
ment of a domestic complaint mechanism. The following two
sections of this Article describe Japan's implementation measures
in these areas.
3.4. Local Government Procurement
3.4.1. Background
Japan's adherence to the GPA may have the greatest impact at
the sub-central level because for the first time Japan's prefectures
and twelve largest cities must comply with international disci-
plines for certain procurements. The GATT Code did not
impose obligations on local governments.'83 The sub-central
governments also escaped binding coverage by the bilateral
accords. The only bilateral commitment that the Japanese
government undertook with regard to local governments was in
several agreements to "encourage" them to adopt open, transpar-
ent, fair, and non-discriminatory procurement procedures
178 See Ministry of Finance Ordinance No. 45 of 1980, as amended by
Ministry of Finance Ordinance No. 70 of 1995.
179 See Ministry of Finance Ordinance No. 52 of 1962, as amended by
Ministry of Finance Ordinance No. 74.
180 See infra notes 193-253 and accompanying text (discussing the measures
adopted withrespect to implementation of the GPA by local governments).
181 See infra notes 295-348 and accompanying text (discussing the measures
taken to establish a complaint mechanism).
12 See su ra notes 150-156 and accompanying text (discussing the coverage
of Japan's su-central entities).
183 The Japanese central government had drawn the attention of local
governments to the GATT Code. On January 23, 1981, shortly after the Code
became effective, the Ministers of Foreign A airs and Home Affairs sent a joint
letter to all local governments, describing the contents of the GATT Code and
urging them to comply with its provisions. See MATSUSHrrA, supra note 127,
at 197.
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comparable to those assumed by the central government."'
3.4.2. Local Government Procurement Law
In contrast to the United States' federal system, Japan has a
unitary system comprised of two tiers of local government, each
with some measure of autonomy.18 The first tier consists of
prefectures and cities, and the second tier includes towns and
villages.18 6 While the Japanese Constitution gives local govern-
ments the "right to manage their property, affairs and administra-
tion and to enact their own regulations within law",187 in fact
"[m]ost of the important items of local government are regulated
by national statutes."188 Ordinances (iarei) enacted by local
assemblies and regulations (kisoku) issued by prefectural governors
and city mayors are subject to national laws, cabinet orders,
ministerial ordinances, and other central government regula-
tions."8 9
The Local Autonomy Law1'9 outlines the general procedures
for conducting local government procurements and delegates the
details to cabinet orders.191 The Cabinet Order Concerning
Enforcement of the Local Autonomy Law (Chih6 Jichi H6 Shik5
Rei) ("Local Autonomy Order") is the primary Cabinet Order
setting out the requirements for local government procure-
ment.
192
In 1995, in order to bring local governments into compliance
with the requirements of the GPA, the Cabinet amended the
Local Autonomy Order193 and adopted a new Cabinet Order
Stipulating Special Procedures for the Procurement of Goods and
1 4 See e.g., Grier, supra note 2, at 42 n.336, 56.
115 See THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 44 (Hideo Tanaka ed. 1976)
[hereinafter Tanaka].
186 See id.
1s7 KENPO [Constitution], art. 94 Japan).
... Tanaka, supra note 185, at 44.
1"9 See id. at 57.
190 See Local Autonomy Law, supra note 151.
191 See Toyama et al., supra note 129, at 96.
192 See Cabinet Order No. 16 of 1947, as amended by Cabinet Order No.
359 of 1995 [hereinafter Local Autonomy Order]; Toyama et al., supra note
129, at 96-97.
193 See Cabinet Order No. 359 of 1995. The application of this Order is
not limited to the local government entities subject to the GPA. See id.
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Specified Services by Local Public Entities (Chih6 Kkyo Dantai no
Buppin to matawa Tokutei Ekimu no Chotatsu Tetsuzuki no Tokurei
o Sadameru Seirez) ("Special Local Order").1 94
Central government entities, primarily the Ministry of Home
Affairs ("MHA")195 have issued various administrative rules,
including notifications (tsfchz) and circulars (tsfitatsu) that pertain
to local government compliance with the GPA's provisions. The
MHA has issued the ministerial counterpart to the Special Local
Order, the Ministerial Ordinance Concerning the Announcement
of Special Procedures for the Procurement of Goods and Specified
Services by Local Public Entities (Chih6 KIeyo Dantai no Buppin
to matawa Tokutei Ekimu no Cho-tatsu Tetsuzuki no Tokurei o
Sadameru Seirei no K6fu ni tsuite).196 The MHA has also issued
other notifications detailing local government obligations.97
The MHA and the Ministry of Construction ("MOC") jointly
issued a circular promoting the reform of bidding and contract
procedures used for public works.1 98
The central government directives and guidance are intended
to ensure that the local governments are fully aware of their
obligations under the GPA. Based on the authority granted by
the central government, and subject to its constraints, each local
government establishes its own regulations, rules, and internal
circular notices to govern its procurement practices and comply
194 See Cabinet Order No. 372 of 1995 [hereinafter Special Local Order].
195 The MHA is responsible for local government affairs. CCH INTERNA-
TIONAL, JAPAN BUSINESS LAW GUIDE, para. 2-380 (Barker Gosling et al.
adduce. 1993).
196 See Ministry of Home Affairs Notification No. 182 of 1995. This
notification includes a delegation of authority to the local governments to
establish necessary rules. See id. art. 8.
197 See Ministry of Home Affairs Notification No. 83 of 1995 (detailing
requirements related to the investigation of qualifications of suppliers, establish-
ment of a registry of qualified suppliers, provision of public notice, tendering
by mail, tendering explanation document, selection and announcement of the
winning supplier, and the preparation and storage of records); Ministry of
Home Affairs Notification No. 84 of 1995 (addressing various procurement
requirements, including valuation of contracts, announcement of qualifications
of suppliers, qualification restrictions, tendering by mail, application of the
minimum price system, and the use of single tendering).
198 Ministry of Construction Notification No. 23 of 1995 & Ministry of
Home Affairs Notification No. 86 of 1995. The MOC is the ministry
responsible for administrative matters relating to construction and civil
engineering. See CCH INTERNATIONAL, supra note 195, para. 2-330.
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with the GPA.199 The most important procedural obligations
imposed on local entities covered by the GPA are described
below.
3.4.3. Basic Requirements of Local Government Procure-
ment
3.4.3.1. Procurement Procedures
The Local Autonomy Law requires local governments to use
open tendering procedures (ippan kyrs6 nyfisatsu), selective
tendering procedures (shimei kyrs5 nyfisatsu), or single tendering
procedures (zuii keiyaku).2° Selective tendering procedures and
single tendering procedures, however, may be used only if they
meet the conditions prescribed by cabinet order.201
The Local Autonomy Order limits the use of selective
tendering procedures to the following cases: (1) in contracts for
construction, production, or the purchase of goods, where, due to
the nature or purpose of the contract, the use of open tendering
procedures would not be appropriate;2 2 (2) where the use of
open tendering procedures is not necessary because, based on the
nature and purpose of the contract, only a small number of
suppliers are expected to participate;2 3 and (3) where the use of
open tendering procedures is deemed to be disadvantageous. 2°'
In the Local Autonomy Order, the Cabinet restricts the use of
single tendering procedures to specific circumstances.0 Local
governments are allowed to use single tendering procedures for
procurements covered by the GPA in the following situations: (1)
when it is not possible to use competitive tendering procedures
199 See Toyama et al., supra note 129, at 97. Examination of the laws and
regulations adopted by specific local governments to meet their GPA
obligations is beyond the scope of this Article.
2 See Local Autonomy Law, supra note 151, art. 234(1).
201 See id. art. 234(2).
202 See Local Autonomy Order, supra note 192, art. 167-1(1).
203 See id. art. 167-1(2).
204 See id. art. 167-1(3).
205 See id. art. 167-2; Special Local Order, supra note 194, art. 10. This
provision of the Special Local Order limits the use of single tendering contracts
authorized by the Local Autonomy Order and adds additional procurements
in which single tendering contracts may be used. See id.
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because of extreme urgency;2°I (2) where there are no partici-
pants in a procurement using open tendering or selective tendering
procedures, or there is no successful bidder when a procurement
is re-tendered; 2 7 (3) where the successful supplier failed to
conclude the contract;28 (4) where for works of art or goods or
services that are protected by exclusive rights such as patents, or
based on specialized knowledge, only a particular supplier can
supply the goods or services and no alternative good or service
exists;2 9 (5) when the procurement is for goods that are replace-
ment parts or related parts for goods already procured or services
of the same kind as those originally procured, and single tendering
is necessary to realize the benefits of the previously procured
goods, and procuring goods or services from a supplier other than
the original supplier would be extremely inconvenient;210 (6)
when an entity procures a prototype or a sample of a good or
service, which results from experimental research undertaken as
the result of a commission by the local entity;211 (7) when the
procurement is for additional construction services that were not
included in the original contract, but which are necessary to
complete the original contract due to unforeseen circumstances,
and procuring the goods or services from anyone other than the
original supplier would be extremely inconvenient;212 (8) when
the procurement is for additional construction services of the same
kind as those in the original contract, but which were not
included in the original contract, and the additional services are
within the objectives of the original contract and it would be
206 See Local Autonomy Order, supra note 192, art. 167-2(1)(iii).
207 See id. art. 167-2(1)(vi). Where the use of single tendering is based on
this provision, entities may not change the estimated price and other tendering
conditions which were established for the initial competitive tendering, except
for the contract deposit and the date of performance. See id. art. 167-2(2).
208 See id. art. 167-2(1)(vii). Where this provision is relied upon to justify
the use of single tendering, the procuring entity may neither accept a price
higher than the price offered by the successful tenderer, nor change any of the
initial tendering conditions, other than the time of performance. See id. art.
167-2(3).
209 See Special Local Order, supra note 194, art. 10(1)(i).
210 See id. art. 10(1)(ii).
211 See id art. 10(1)(iii).
212 See id. art. 10(1)(iv). The total value of the contract for the additional
construction services may not exceed 50% of the amount of the main contract.
See id.
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relatively disadvantageous to procure from someone other than
the original contractor;2 13 and (9) for procurements in which in
a contest for the design of a building, the winner is selected based
on procedures which satisfy conditions established by the Minister
of Home Affairs.214
3.4.3.2. Qualifications of Suppliers
In order to participate in a local government procurement, an
interested supplier must meet the qualifications set by the
procuring entity and avoid disqualification. Local governments
are allowed to establish qualifications for their procurements,
subject to restrictions imposed by the central government.
A local government may not qualify a potential supplier for
participation in a procurement if the supplier has been determined
to be incompetent, quasi-competent, or bankrupt, except in special
cases. 21" A local government has discretion to refuse to qualify
a supplier when the supplier, any of its agents, managers, or other
employees, or its representative in the tendering has committed a
disqualifying act described in the Local Autonomy Order.216
These disqualifying acts include: (1) intentionally constructing or
producing low quality goods or engaging in dishonest behavior
related to the quantity or quality of goods in performing a
contract; (2) obstructing the conduct of fair tendering procedures,
including conspiring to fix prices; (3) interfering with the
completion of a contract by the successful tenderer; (4) hindering
an official in the performance of his supervisory duty of inspec-
tion related to the performance of a contract; (5) failing to
perform a contract without a valid reason; and (6) employing in
213 See id. art. 10(1)(v). This provision is limited to cases in which the
contract for the original construction services was concluded in accordance with
competitive tendering procedures in Articles 4 through 9 of the Special Local
Order, and the public notice or announcement indicated that additional
construction services of the same kind might be procured. See id.
214 See id. art. 10(1)(vi).
215 See Local Autonomy Order, supra note 192, arts. 167-4(1) (open
tendering), 167-11(1) (selective tendering).
216 See id. arts. 167-4(2) (open tendering), 167-11(1) (selective tendering).
The disqualifying acts in central government procurement are very similar. See
Cabinet Accounting Order, supra note 175, art. 71(1); Toyama et Al., supra note
129, at 100-01; Grier, supra note 2, at 7 n.38. The disqualification applies for
two years after the commission of any of the disqualifying acts. See Local
Autonomy Order, supra note 192, art. 167-4(2).
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the performance of a contract an agent, manager, or other
employee who in the prior two years has engaged in one of the
disqualifying acts described above. 7
In addition to specifying grounds for disqualifying an interest-
ed supplier, the central government also gives local governments
direction as to the types of qualifications that they may impose on
suppliers seeking to participate in open tendering procedures.21
The permissible qualifications include the supplier's past business
performance in construction, production, or sales; the number of
employees in its workforce; the amount of its capitalization; and
other matters relating to the scale of the supplier's operations and
general state of its business. 29  Local governments must apply
these qualifications when they use selective tendering procedures
for certain types of contracts, particularly those for construction,
production, and the purchase of goods.2'0 Additionally, the
local government may impose further qualifications on suppli-
ers. 2
1
While local governments are generally allowed to require that
suppliers maintain an office within the jurisdiction,' entities
covered by the GPA are expressly prohibited from establishing
such a qualification in procurements covered by the GPA when
open tendering procedures are used.
When an entity undertakes a procurement using open
tendering procedures, it must publish a notice of the qualifications
that suppliers must have in order to participate in the procure-
217 See Local Autonomy Order, supra note 192, arts. 1674(2) (open
tendering), 167-11(1) (selective tendering).
211 See id. art. 167-5(1).
219 See id. These qualifications are similar to those that may be established
for suppliers interested in participating in central government procurements.
See Cabinet Accounting Order, supra note 175, art. 72(1); Toyama et al., supra
note 129, at 102; Grier, supra note 2, at 7. When a local government establishes
such qualifications as necessary in open tendering procedures, it must give
public notice of the qualifications. See Local Autonomy Order, supra note 192,
art. 167-5(2).
22 See Local Autonomy Order, supra note 192, art. 167-11(2).
221 See id.
See id. arts. 167-5-2 (open tendering), 167-11(3) (selective tendering). See
also infra notes 258-260 and accompanying text.
See Special Local Order, supra note 194, art. 5.
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ment 3 4  Every year, entities must also announce supplier
qualifications for expected procurements.' Entities must
maintain a registry of suppliers who meet the qualification
requirements.226  When open tendering procedures are used,
entities must establish by regulation the amount or percentage of
deposit that will be required of suppliers participating in a
procurement?"
3.4.3.3. Designation of Participants in Selective
Tendering Procedures
When local entities use selective tendering procedures, they
must select the suppliers that will be allowed to participate in the
procurement from among the suppliers that have the necessary
qualifications.B In such cases, the entity must notify the
designated suppliers of the time and place for submitting their
tenders and other important tender information.' '  The entity
must also notify the suppliers that it will deem invalid tenders
submitted by suppliers who lack the necessary qualifications and
tenders that do not comply with the tendering terms.20
3.4.3.4. Procurement Information
When open tendering procedures are used, entities must
publish a notice of the proposed procurement, which includes the
following information: (1) the procurement procedures being
used; (2) qualifications required of suppliers; (3) the place for
obtaining the contract terms; (4) the time and place for submitting
tenders; (5) information on obtaining the tender explanation
" See Local Autonomy Order, supra note 192, art. 167-6(1). This notice
must include a statement that tenders submitted by suppliers that do not meet
the necessary qualifications and tenders that violate tie tendering conditions
will be deemed invalid. See id. art. 167-6(2).
See Special Local Order, supra note 194, art. 4.
-. See Ministry of Home Affairs Notification No. 83 of 1995, supra note197.
_ See Local Autonomy Order, supra note 192, art. 167-7(1). In place of a
money deposit, entities are authorized to substitute national or local bonds or
other securities deemed safe by the local entity. See id. art. 167-7(2).
"I See id. art. 167-12(1).
21 See id. art. 167-12(2).
230 See id. art. 167-12(3).
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document;2' (6) the deposit required to participate in the
tendering; (7) information that the procurement is part of a series
of procurements;1 2 and (8) the method of selecting the winning
tender.23  For procurements using selective tendering proce-
dures, the entities must publicly announce the same informa-
tion. T
When a local entity uses either open tendering procedures or
selective tendering procedures, it must make available a document
that explains the local requirements for tendering.3  This docu-
ment must be provided upon request to suppliers who want to
participate in the procurement.26
3.4.3.5. Selection of Winning Tender
Under the GPA, contracts are to be awarded to the tenderer
that is "determined to be fully capable of undertaking the
contract" and that offers "either the lowest tender or the tender
which in terms of the specific evaluation criteria ... is determined
to be most advantageous." 23  The GPA does not express a
preference between the two approaches.
Under Japanese law, however, the selection of a tenderer other
than the one offering the lowest price is narrowly restricted. The
Accounts Law, in the case of central government procure-
ments,238 and the Local Cabinet Law, in the case of local govern-
ment procurements,239 stipulate that when open tendering or
selective tendering procedures are used, the procuring entity
generally must award the contract to the supplier who submits the
lowest or highest price, depending on the contract, that is within
the provisional value of the contract.2' The provisional value
231 See Special Local Order, supra note 194, art. 6(5); see also infra notes 235-
236.
232 See Special Local Order, supra note 194, art. 6(4).
2 See Local Autonomy Order, supra note 192, art. 167-6(1); Special Local
Order, supra note 194, art. 6.
" See Special Local Order, supra note 194, art. 7.
235 See id. art. 8.
236 See id.
137 GPA, supra note 5, art. XIII(4)(b); supra note 95 and accompanying text.
238 See Accounts Law, supra note 145, art. 29-6(1).
'9 See Local Autonomy Law, supra note 151, art. 234(3).
240 See Accounts Law, supra note 145, art. 29-6(1); Local Autonomy Law,
supra note 151, art. 234(3).
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or estimated contract price (yotei kakaku) is the upper limit of the
amount that the entity is authorized to expend on a given
procurement. 241 Two exceptions for awarding the contract to
the supplier offering the second lowest price within the provision-
al value are when the procuring entity finds that: (1) the supplier
offering the lowest price will be unable to perform the contract
adequately because the tender price is extraordinarily low; or (2)
it would be inappropriate to award the contract to the lowest
tenderer because it would not be in the interests of fair and
orderly trade.242 In such a case, the entity may select the second
lowest tender that is within the provisional value.243 In the case
of local government procurement, these exceptions only apply to
contracts for construction or production.2 4
The central government had seldom used its authority to
employ other evaluation methods245 until it was obligated in a
series of bilateral agreements to use "the greatest overall value
methodology" to evaluate tenders in a variety of
procurements. 246
Local governments have general authority to establish
minimum prices (saitei seigen kakaku) in procurements for
construction or production, if they determine that there is a
special need to ensure performance of the contract.247 Under
this system, the local entity sets a minimum price for the
procurement and then rejects any tender with a price that is
241 Toyama et al., supra note 129, at 106.
242 See Accounts Law, supra note 145, art. 29-6(1); Local Autonomy Order,
supra note 192, art. 167-10; see also Toyama et al., supra note 129, at 106. In
central government procurements, these exceptions apply to construction and
production procurements of more than 10,000,000 yen. See Cabinet Account-
ing Order, supra note 175, art. 84.
243 See Accounts Law, supra nQte 145, art. 29-6; Local Autonomy Order,
supra note 192, art. 167-10(1); see also Toyama et al., supra note 129, at 106-07
(noting that, although the exceptions permitting officials to take the second
lowest bid potentially allows the "effective evisceration" of the rule, the
exceptions are rarely used).
244 See Local Autonomy Order, supra note 192, art. 167-10(1).
245 See Toyama et al., supra note 129, at 106-07.
246 See Grier, supra note 2, at 64. This methodology requires consideration
of the technical and functional merits of a tender, as well as price. See id.
247 See Local Autonomy Order, supra note 192, art. 167-10(2) (open
tendering), art. 167-13(1) (selective .tendering); see also infra notes 269-278 and
accompanying text (discussion of the practice).
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below the minimum price.24 As part of its implementation of
the GPA, the Cabinet has prohibited local entities from using the
minimum price system in procurements covered by the GPA.249
In place of the minimum price system, entities are to use a "low
price investigation system" (teikakaku chosa seido),m which
allows entities to investigate very low bids.25
3.4.3.6. Public Announcement of the Winning
Tenderer
When a local entity selects a winning tender using open
tendering or selective tendering procedures, or when a supplier in
a single tendering contract is selected, the entity is required to
announce publicly the name of the winning supplier. 2 2
3.4.3. Z Complaint Mechanism
The MHA has issued a notification to prefectural governors
and mayors of the designated cities with regard to establishment
of a complaint mechanism to meet the requirements of Article
Twenty of the GPA.3" In this notification, the MHA requested
that the local governments make the necessary arrangements to
establish a government procurement review board and complaint
review procedures, which are comparable to those instituted by
the central government for its procurements." 4
24 See Local Autonomy Order, supra note 192, art. 167-10(2).
249 See Special Local Order, supra note 194, art. 9.
250 See Ministry of Home Affairs Notification No. 84, supra note 197;
Home Affairs Ministry to Reform Bidding System for More Than 2.43 Million
Worth of Public Works Projects Sponsored by Prefectures and Government
Ordinance-Designated Cities, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Aug. 28, 1995, at 1
translated in Cable 9816 from American Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Wash. D.C. (Aug. 29, 1995) [hereinafter NIKKEI - Aug. 28, 1995]
(copy on file with author).
251 See NwKKEi - Aug. 28, 1995, supra note 250.
252 See Special Local Order, supra note 194, art. 11.
253 See Seifu Chrtatsu ni Kansuru Kyotei Dai 20 ni Sadameru Kuj5 Shori
Tetsuzuki no Seibi ni Tsuite [Notification Concerning Preparation of
Complaint Review Procedures Stipulated in GPA Art. 20], Ministry of Home
Affairs Notification (Dec. 1, 1995).
114 See id. See also infra notes 295-297 (regarding the complaint mechanism
established by the central government).
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3.4.4. Implications of Application of GPA to Local
Governments
Local governments are important players in public sector
procurement. For example, they account for approximately
eighty percent of public works undertaken in Japan.5 The
extension of the GPA to the most important local governments
is likely to have two major effects on local procurement. First,
the GPA requires local entities to use fair, transparent, and
predictable procurement procedures that will reduce the exercise
of local discretion and increase competition.2" Second, the
GPA requires the removal of certain local procurement practices,
in particular the use of qualification requirements favoring local
firms and the minimum price system. These practices are
discussed below. The result should be new opportunities for
foreign firms to participate in an important segment of govern-
ment procurement in Japan.
3.4.4.1. Preferential Qualifications
Although local procurement requirements have largely
paralleled those of the central government,257 they were not
subject to the disciplines imposed by the GATT Code. Because
local entities were not under any obligation to accord non-
discriminatory treatment to foreign suppliers, they could favor
local firms in their procurements without fear of penalty.
It is an "unwritten law" in Japan that local governments give
priority to local firms when conducting procurements.25 Local
governments routinely give preferential treatment to local firms
by establishing qualifications for participation in a procurement
that non-local firms cannot meet.259 Most local governments
251 See Limits of "Restrictions Applicable"- Hard to Eliminate Preference for
Local Firms, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 7, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter NKKEI
- Nov. 7. 1994].
256 See id.
217 See Toyama et al., supra note 129, at 96.
258 See NIKKEi - Nov. 7, 1994, supra note 255.
2" See Follow-up Meeting for Japan-U.S. Construction Talks, NIHON KEIZAI
SHIMBUN, June 27, 1995, at 5 translated in Cable 7586 from U.S. Embassy,
Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C. Gune 30, 1995) [hereinafter
NIKKEI - June 27, 1995] (copy on file with author); WTO Government-Procure-
ment Accord to Take Effect Next Year, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, June 24, 1995,
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accomplish this aim by requiring suppliers to maintain a branch
or headquarters office within their jurisdiction if the suppliers
want to be eligible to participate in local procurements.6 ° One
example is Akaho City, which awarded eighty percent of its 200
contracts to approximately seventy local firms.261
Preference for local firms is attributable in part to Japan's
"highly decentralized system [which] allows local procurement
decisions to reflect parochial concerns and to favor local suppli-
ers."262  Local governments often defend local preferences as a
necessary means of ensuring funds from their legislative assem-
blies.263 As noted above, in its implementation of the GPA, the
Japanese government has expressly prohibited local government
entities subject to the GPA from employing office location as a
qualification criterion in GPA-covered procurements.2 4  For
entities and procurements not under the GPA, however, the Local
Autonomy Law allows such qualifications.2 5
Qualification requirements based on locality impede foreign
and non-local domestic firms from gaining access to public sector
procurements at the local level, even if they have the necessary
technical capability and offer competitive prices.266 Maintaining
offices in every local jurisdiction in which a firm wants to bid on
local government contracts is not a practical alternative.2 7 Such
practices that discriminate against foreign firms are prohibited by
the GPA, which requires signatories to accord national treatment
to the products, services, and suppliers of the other signato-
ries.2
68
at 5 translated in Cable 8200 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Wash., D.C. (July 17, 1995) [hereinafter NKXEI - June 24, 1995]
(copy on file with author).
26" See Local Japanese Governments Urged to Use Open Construction Bidding,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 6, 1995, at 12 [hereinafter Local Governments Urged
to Use Open Bidding]; NKKEi - June 27, 1995, supra note 259.
261 See NImKEI - Nov. 7, 1994, supra note 255.
262 Grier, supra note 2, at 11.
263 See NIKKEI - June 24, 1995, supra note 259.
264 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
265 See Local Autonomy Order, supra note 192, arts. 167-5-2, 167-11(3).
266 See NKEI - June 27, 1995, supra note 259; Local Governments Urged
to Use Open Bidding, supra note 260.
267 See Local Governments Urged to Use Open Bidding, supra note 260.
262 See GPA, supra note 5, art. III(1).
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3.4.4.2. Minimum Price System
Another common local practice that has been abolished as part
of Japan's implementation of the GPA is the minimum price
system. 269 Under this practice, local governments set a mini-
mum bidding price or "lowest permissible value" 9 at a level
that is about twenty percent lower than the estimated price or
provisional value?1  Procuring entities then exclude from
participation in the procurement all suppliers that submit tenders
with prices below the minimum price, solely for that reason.27 2
A Japanese government study revealed that in Japanese Fiscal
Year 1994, forty-five of forty-seven prefectures and nine of the
twelve designated cities maintained restrictions on the lowest price
in bidding for public works projects. 3  These restrictions are
intended to prevent firms from being awarded a contract at a price
that is excessively low and may result in inferior construction
work.? 4 In fact, the minimum price restrictions exclude firms
that are fully able to fulfill the requirements of the procurement
merely because they submitted a tender with a price below the
minimum price?25 This technical requirement results in the
exclusion of foreign and Japanese suppliers with sufficient capabili-
ties of supplying the required goods and services at prices below
the minimum priceY 6 According to U.S. general contractors,
269 See NIKKEI - Aug. 28, 1995, supra note 250.
o See Toyama et al., supra note 129, at 106 n.80, (citing Local Autonomy
Law, supra note 151, art. 234(3) and Local Autonomy Order, supra note 192,
art. 167-10(2)); see also NIKKEI - Aug. 28, 1995, supra note 250.
27' See NIKKEi - Aug. 28, 1995, supra note 250; NIKKEI - June 24, 1995,
supra note 259.
272 See NIKKEI - Aug. 28, 1995, supra note 250; NIKKET - June 24, 1995,
supra note 259.
2 See NIKKEI - June 24, 1995, supra note 259. The comparable figure for
other local governments was as follows: 420 cities (62% of the total) and more
than 1300 towns and villages (51% of the total) maintained restrictions on
lowest price. See id.
274 See id.
275 See NIKKEI - June 24, 1995, supra note 259; see also Aftermath of General
Bidding - Minimum-Price System Serves as Underpinning, NIHON KEIZAI
SHIMBUN, Nov. 4, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter NIKKEI - Nov. 4, 1994] (citing
examples in which firms have been excluded from participation in a procure-
ment because they submitted bids that fell below the lowest acceptable price).
276 NIKKEI - June 24, 1995, supra note 259.
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the "unconditional application of the lower limit hampers [efforts]
to reduce construction costs with various cost-saving measures,
and negates technical and operational efficiencies of U.S. firms, as
well as the cost advantages of U.S.-made construction materi-
als. " ' One of the consequences of this practice is that public
works projects are estimated to cost ten to forty percent more in
Japan than in the United StatesY
Abolition of the minimum price for GPA-covered procure-
ments removes an arbitrary basis for excluding suppliers from
participating in a procurement if they' are able to offer a low
price. It also ensures that when local governments use the lowest
price methodology for selecting the winning supplier, they will
award the contract to the supplier that offers the lowest price.
Use of a low price investigation system will mean that local
entities can investigate prices that they believe may be too low to
enable the supplier to adequately fulfill the contract.
The use of the minimum price system and the locality require-
ments block participation in procurements by firms with the
technical capability of undertaking the contract and offering a
competitive priceY2'9  The elimination of these practices is
expected to have a significant impact on the opportunities
available to foreign firms to compete in local government
procurements in Japan.2  Implementation of the GPA at the
sub-central level is likely to be a "continuing challenge in coming
years" as local governments subject for the first time to interna-
tional procurement standards modify their local regulations and
practices.2
277 Cable 10283 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Wash., D.C., (Sept. 11, 1995) (Major Projects: In Wake Bilateral Construction
Action Plan Review, MHA Announces Abolition of "Lower Limit" and "Office
Location" Requirements) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Sept. 11, 1995
Cable].
278 See NKKEI - Nov. 4, 1994, supra note 275; NMKEI - June 24, 1995,
supra note 259.
279 See NIKKEI - Aug. 28, 1995, supra note 250.
281 See Sept. 11, 1995 Cable, supra note 277.
281 USTR, ANNUAL REPORT ON DIsCRIMINATION IN FOREIGN GOvERN-
MENT PROCUREMENT 11 (1996).
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3.5. Japan-s Adoption of a Complaint Mechanism
3.5.1. Government Procurement Review Prior to the
GPA
Before 1990, Japan did not have a review system tailored to
government procurement 2 2 analogous to the system which is
integral to the procurement system in the United States.283
Beginning with the 1990 U.S.-Japan Supercomputer Agreement
("Supercomputer Agreement"),284 Japan agreed in a series of
bilateral procurement agreements to establish review boards to
hear complaints of suppliers regarding procurements covered by
the agreements. Complaint mechanisms were incorporated into
all but one of the bilateral accords negotiated by the United States
and Japan between 1990 and 1994.85 In addition, during this
period, Japan adopted action plans that included complaint
mechanisms similar to those found in the bilateral agreements.286
The United States sought the establishment of the complaint
mechanisms to provide suppliers with a means for obtaining
independent review of procurements, thereby eliminating the need
for U.S. government intervention on the supplier's behalf.2 7
282 See GATT, PRACTICAL GuiDE TO THE GATT AGREEMENT ON
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 271 (1989) (Revised).
23 Bid challenge mechanisms have long been a part of the U.S. Govern-
ment procurement system. See 1 RALPH C. NASH, JR., & JOHN CIBnNIC, JR.,
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW 803 (1977).
284 The 1990 U.S.-Japan Supercomputer Agreement is comprised of an
exchange of letters between the Ambassador of Japan and the U.S. Trade
Representative and an incorporated attachment, Procedures to Introduce
Supercomputers. See Letters between Carla A. Hills, U.S. Trade Representative,
and Ryohei Murata, Ambassador of Japan (June 15, 1990) [hereinafter 1990
Supercomputer Agreement] (copy on file with author); see also Grier, supra note
2, at 30-31 (discussing the establishment of a Procurement Review Board by the
Japanese government to enable foreign suppliers to challenge any aspect of a
supercomputer procurement).
285 See Grier, supra note 2, at 64. Bilateral complaint mechanisms cover
procurements of supercomputers, satellites, public works, computers, medical
technology, and telecommunications. See id. at 64-65. The only exception is
the 1994 NTT Improved Procedures. See id, at 64 n.530.
286 See id. at 44 (Public Works Action Plan), 53-54 (1994 Action Program).
See infra note 291 and accompanying text for a description of the 1994 Action
Program.
287 See Jean Heilman Grier, The Use of Section 301 to Open Japanese Markets
to Foreign Firms, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 14 (1992).
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These complaint mechanisms require the Japanese government to
establish procurement review boards to investigate complaints by
domestic and foreign suppliers alleging that government entities
have improperly conducted procurements covered by the agree-
ments.28 The Board must allow procuring entities and suppliers
participating in the procurement to present their views on the
procurement.2 9  At the conclusion of its investigation, the
Board issues a report of its findings and recommendations. 290
The bilateral mechanisms cover complaints iivolving procure-
ments subject to the particular agreement. The 1994 Action
Program,291 which applied to all product areas covered by the
GATT Code, established the mechanism with the broadest
application. 292 This program, however, was "provisional" until
Japan established the complaint mechanism required by the
GPA.2 93 The GPA mechanism is very similar to the complaint
mechanisms established under the bilateral accords and the action
plans, particularly the 1994 Action Program.
Despite the availability of these complaint mechanisms, only
one party has filed a complaint seeking review of a procurement
under a bilateral complaint mechanism.9  Because Japan's
treatment of that complaint raised concerns of both the U.S.
government and U.S. industry, the circumstances of Japan's
review of that complaint are considered later in this Article.
288 See, e.g., 1990 Supercomputer Agreement, supra note 284, Attachment
S 11(2).
289 See id.
290 See id. Attachment S 1[1(4.1).
291 See Government of Japan, Action Program on Government Procurement,
in Letter from Koichiro Matsuura, Japanese Deputy Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to Charlene Barshefsky, Deputy USTR (Feb. 4, 1994) [hereinafter 1994
Action Program] (copy on file with author); see also Grier, supra note 2, at 53-54
(discussing the main objectives and contents of the 1994 Action Program for
government procurement).
292 See 1994 Action Program, supra note 291, S IV(A).
293 See id. Similarly, the complaint mechanisms provided for in the 1994
Public Works Action Plan and in the bilateral accords covering telecommunica-
tions and medical technology procurements were also provisional until the new
WTO mechanism entered into effect. See Grier, supra note 2, at 44, 60 n.513.
294 See infra notes 355-366 and accompanying text for discussion of the
complaint.
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3.5.2. Japan-s Complaint Mechanism
3.5.2.1. Overview
To meet the GPA requirement for a complaint mechanism,
the Japanese Cabinet established two entities on December 1,
1995, an Office of Government Procurement Review
("OGPR")29' and a Government Procurement Review Board
("GPRB" or "Board").296 Subsequently, on December 14, 1995,
the OGPR adopted procedures to govern the complaint review
process.29  This Article will next examine the OGPR, the
GPRB, and the complaint review process.
3.5.2.2. Office of Government Procurement Review
The Cabinet directed the OGPR to implement the procedures
required by the GPA for challenging procurements by the central
government entities and other central government-related enti-
ties.29 The Cabinet further instructed the OGPR "to enhance
the transparency, fairness, and competitiveness" of the Japanese
government procurement system.299
The Chief Cabinet Secretary heads the new OGPR.3 °  Its
members include the Administrative Vice Ministers of the twelve
ministries and high-level officials from various agencies.01 These
agencies include the National Defense Agency, the National Police
295 See GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REVIEW (Dec. 1, 1995) [hereinafter OGPR
ORDER] (Cabinet Decision) translated in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
INTERIM COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REVIEW, Doc. GPA/IC/W/37
Dec. 22, 1995) S 1 [hereinafter WTO COMMUNICATION] (Communication
ram Japan) (copy on file with author).
296 See OGPR Order, supra note 295, S 2.
297 See GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT PROCURE-
MENT REVIEW, COMPLAINT REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT (Dec. 14, 1995) [hereinafter OGPR PROCEDURES] (Decision of
the OGPR) translated in WTO COMMUNICATION, supra note 295, at 4-10.
298 See OGPR ORDER, supra note 295, § 1(1).
299 Id.
"0 See id. S 1(2). The Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Administra-
tive Vice Minister of the Economic Planning Agency are the two Deputy
Heads of the OGPR. See id.
301 See id.
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Agency, and the Science and Technology Agency.a0 2  The
OGPR is under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Of-
fice, 33 with the Economic Planning Agency responsible for its
administration.
304
3.5.2.3. Government Procurement Review Board
The GPRB is responsible for reviewing complaints filed by
suppliers with regard to procurements by central government
entities and central government-related entities. 305  The head of
the OGPR appoints the members of the Board, who must be
"scientists, scholars, and other members with experience in
government procurement."3 6 The OGPR authorizes the Board
to establish subcommittees for specific product or service
areas.
307
The Board must conduct its review in an independent and
impartial manner,30 8 with the further condition that any Board
member "deemed to have a conflict of interest in the complaint"
must not participate in the review of that complaint.3° Reviews
of complaints are required to be based on the procurement
procedures set forth in the GPA and applicable Designated
302 See id. The head of the OGPR can appoint other members as necessary.
See id.
303 See id. at 2.
" See id. S 3. An official of the Economic Planning Agency serves as the
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the OGPR. See id. § 1(3).
305 See id. S 2(1).
" Id. S 2(2). The seven member Board includes four university professors
and one lawyer, who serves as chairman. See ECONOMIC PLANNING AGENCY,
GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, A GUIDE TO THE NEW SYSTEM OF COMPLAINT
REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 15 [hereinafter EPA
GUIDE]. The Board has fourteen special members, ten of whom come from the
academic community, including six from the prestigious University of Tokyo.
See id.
307 See OGPR PROCEDURES, supra note 297, S 1(3). The Chairman of the
GPRB appoints subcommittee chairs. See id. S 1(4). The GPRB established six
subcommittees to cover the six sectors subject to bilateral procurement
agreements (supercomputers, computers, satellites, public works, telecommuni-
cations, and medical technologyJ. See EPA GUIDE, supra note 306, at 16.
Regular members of the Board chair the subcommittees and professors comprise
two-thirds of the subcommittee members. See id.
30 See OGPR Order, supra note 295, S 2(1).
309 OGPR Procedures, supra note 297, § 1(2).
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Measures,310 as well as the complaint review procedures adopted
by the OGPR.311
3.5.2.4. Complaint Review Process
The OGPR's Complaint Review Procedures for Government
Procurement ("OGPR Procedures") outline the process that the
Board must follow when it reviews complaints.3
3.5.2.4.1 Filing of Complaints
Under the new Japanese complaint mechanism, any supplier
may file a complaint with the GPRB when it believes that a
central government entity or central government-related entity has
conducted a procurement in a manner that is inconsistent with a
provision of the GPA or applicable Designated Measures.313
Suppliers eligible to challenge a procurement are "those who
supplied, or were capable of supplying the product or service
when the procuring entity procured the product or service. "314
310 See OGPR ORDER, supra note 295, 5 2(1). The Designated Measures are
the U.S.-Japan bilateral procurement agreements and unilateral action plans that
provide for a complaint mechanism. See GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, OFFICE OF
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REVIEW, DESIGNATION OF APPLICABLE MEA-
SURES ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, (Dec. 14, 1995) [hereinafter
DESIGNATED MEASURES] (Decision of the Head of the OGPR) translated in
WTO COMMUNICATION, supra note 295, at 11-12.
311 See OGPR ORDER, supra note 295, S 2(1). The Procedures apply even
if a party has filed a lawsuit involving the procurement. See OGPR PROCE-
DURES, supra note 297, S 4(7)(ii).
312 See OGPR PROCEDURES, supra note 297, at 4-10. In the event that the
OGPR Procedures conflict with the complaint procedures in the bilateral
agreements covering supercomputers, satellites, or computers, the sectoral
provisions apply. See id. S 9(2).
313 See id. S 2(2). Suppliers are "encouraged to seek resolution" of their
complaints initially with the procuring entity. Id. In such cases, the entity
must enter into consultations promptly and "make efforts to resolve the
complaint." Id. S 2(3). Suppliers must file complaints, in a prescribed form,
with the OGPR's Secretariat, located in the Office for Government Procure-
ment Challenge System in the Economic Planning Agency. See EPA GUIDE,
supra note 306, at 3. The required information includes the tender bidding
number as announced in the Kanp5, a description of the complaint, and a
statement of whether the supplier consulted with the procuring entity. See id.,
Attachment 1, at 7.
314 OGPR PROCEDURES, supra note 297, S 2(1)(i). This definition applies
to all procurements, except procurements of construction services and design
and consulting services in public works where separate definitions apply. See
id. S 2(1)(ii)-(iii). In such procurements, definitions have been incorporated
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Other suppliers may also participate in a complaint review if they
"have interests in the procurement subject to the complaint."31
While suppliers may file a complaint at any time during the
procurement process, they must file it within ten days after they
knew or reasonably should have known the facts forming the
basis of the complaint.31 After a supplier files a complaint, the
GPRB reviews it,3 17 and under certain conditions, may dismiss
it.31 To dismiss a complaint, the Board must find that it was
not filed in a timely manner,319 is not subject to the GPA or
Designated Measures,320 is "frivolous or trivial,"321 is not sub-
mitted by a supplier, as 'defined by the GPRB Procedures,3 = or
is "otherwise inappropriate for review by the Board."323 When
the Board finds that a complaint is proper, it must immediately
give a written notice to the complaining supplier, as well as the
entity whose procurement is subject to review, and publicly
announce its decision in the Kanp6.324
from the complaint mechanism in the U.S.-Japan 1994 Public Works
Agreement ("1994 Public Works Agreement"). The 1994 Public Works
Agreement is comprised of an exchange of letters between the Japanese
Ambassador to the U.S. and the U.S. Secretary of Commerce Glan. 19, 1994).
See Letters between Takakazu Kuriyama, Japanese Ambassador to the U.S., and
Ronald H. Brown, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Glan. 19, 1994) Annex 4, S 2
[hereinafter 1994 Public Works Agreement] (copy on file with author).
315 OGPR PROCEDURES, supra note 297, § 3(1). To participate in a
complaint review, a supplier must notify the GPRB of its intent to participate
within five days after it receives public notice that the Board has accepted the
complaint. See id. % 3(3), 4(5). References to days mean calendar days unless
otherwise specified. See id. 3(3).
316 See id. S 4(1).
317 The Board must review the complaint within seven working days after
the supplier files it. See id. § 4(3). Working days are days that are not Japanese
Government holidays. See id.
311 See id. The GPRB will not accept complaints involving procurements
that are not subject to the GPA. See id S 4(2).
319 See id. P 4(3)(i). The Board may accept complaints not filed in a timely
manner, if it finds reasonable cause. See id. 5 4(4).
320 See id. S 4(3)(ii).
321 Id. 5 4(3)(iii).
322 See id. S 4(3)(iv).
32 Id. S 4(3)(v). The Board must present its reason for dismissal in
writing. See id. S 4(3).
321 See id. § 4(5); EPA GUIDE, supra note 306, at 4. The entity which
carried out the procurement subject to review must participate in the review
process. See OGPR PROCEDURES, supra note 297, S 3(2).
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3.5.2.4.2. Suspension of Procurement Process
Within ten days after a supplier files a complaint, the Board
generally must request that the procuring entity suspend either: (1)
the award of the contract, in the case of a pre-award com-
plaint;325 or (2) the performance of the contract, in the case of
a post-award complaint,326 pending resolution of the com-
plaint.3 2' When the GPRB requests suspension, the procuring
entity is obligated to suspend the award or performance immedi-
ately, unless the head of the procuring entity determines that
"urgent and compelling circumstances" or "national interests"
preclude it from complying with the request. 28 When a procur-
ing entity does not comply with a suspension request, it must
notify the Board immediately of its decision and set out "the
factual circumstances on which it is based."329
3.5.2.4.3. Review of Complaints
The Board must base its review of a complaint on the briefs,
pleadings, and other documentation that it -requests the complain-
ant and procuring entity to file.330 The OGPR procedures
direct the procuring entity to submit to the Board a written
report that includes the specifications of the product or service to
be procured and other relevant documentation.33 The report
must fully respond to the complaint with all relevant facts,
findings, actions, and the entity's recommendations.332 After
receiving the report from the procuring entity, the Board is
2 See OGPR PROCEDURES, supra note 297, S 4(6)(i). A pre-award
complaint seeks review of a procurement before the selection of a winning
supplier and the award of a contract. See id.
326 See id. S 4(6)(ii). A post-award complaint involves review of a
procurement after the award of a contract. See il.
" The Board is not obligated to request suspension if it finds that "urgent
and compelling circumstances" exist. Id. S 4(6)(iii). In such cases, the Board
must immediately notify the complainant and the OGPR in writing of its
determination and rationale. See i
328 .id. S 4(6)(iv).
329 Id.
330 See id. S 4(7)(i).
331 See id. S 4(8)(i). Within two weeks after the Board sends the complaint
to the procuring entity, the entity must submit its report. See id.
332 See id.
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required to provide the complainant and participants with an
opportunity to review and submit comments on the entity
report.
333
In the Board's review of a complaint, both the complainant
and the procuring entity are accorded certain rights. Those rights
include: (1) the right to attend meetings of the Board accompa-
nied by representatives; 334 (2) the right to present arguments and
the testimony of witnesses before the Board;33 (3) the right to
hear the statements of opposing parties at Board meetings, unless
the Board determines that such a practice would be "inappropri-
ate;" 336 and (4) the right to request public hearings on the merits
of the complaint.337 The Board may also "hear the views of
technical experts and others with knowledge or experience relating
to the procurement under review."331 When a supplier provides
the Board with trade secrets, manufacturing processes, intellectual
property, or other confidential commercial information, the Board
may not disclose such information to third persons without the
supplier's consent. 39
3.5.2.4.4. Board Findings and Recommendations
At the culmination of its review and within ninety days after
a party files the complaint, the Board is responsible for preparing
a written report of its findings. ° In formulating its report, the
Board may consider factors in addition to whether the entity
33 See id. S 4(8)(ii). The Board must give these parties seven days to
comment on the entity's report. See id. Instead of filing comments on the
report, the parties may request that the Board make findings and recommenda-
tions on the basis of the report. See id.
311 See id. S 4(7)(iv). Lawyers may serve as the parties' representatives. See
EPA GUIDE, supra note 306, at 3. Parties may also hire technical experts. See
id.
331 See OGPR PROCEDURES, supra note 297, 5 4(7)(iii)-(vi).
336 Id. S 4(7)(v).
337 See id. S 4(7)(viii).. As an alternative, the Board may hold a public
hearing on its own initiative. See id.
33 Id. S 4(7)(ix). Such technical experts and others must not have "any
substantive interests in the procurement." Id.
339 See id. S 4(8)(iii).
0 See id. S 5(1). When the complaint involves a public works procure-
ment, the Board has up to 50 days to submit its report. See id. The 1994
Public Works Agreement provides for this deadline. See 1994 Public Works
Agreement, supra note 314, Annex 4, S 5(1).
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complied with the GPA or Designated Measures. 4' The factors
that the Board may consider include:
the seriousness of any deficiency in the procurement
process, the degree of prejudice to all or any suppliers, the
degree of impediment to the integrity and effectiveness of
the Agreement or other Measures, the good faith of the
complainant and the entity concerned, the extent of perfor-
mance of contract to which the procurement relates, the
cost of the recommendations to the Government of Japan,
the urgency of the procurement, and the impact of the
recommendations on the operations of the entity. 42
In its written report, the Board must state the basis for its
findings, determine the validity of the complaint, and ascertain
whether the procurement conflicts with specific provisions of the
GPA or Designated Measures.4 When the Board finds that the
procurement was not conducted in accordance with the GPA or
Designated Measures, it is required to recommend appropriate
remedies.344  The Board may recommend that the entity: (1)
issue new tender documentation; (2) seek new offers or tenders
without changing procurement conditions; (3) re-evaluate the
offers; (4) award the contract to a different supplier; or (5)
terminate the contract.345
The Complaint Procedures anticipate that the procuring entity
will normally implement the recommendations of the Board.
3 46
If the entity decides not to comply with the recommendations, it
must report to the Board and the OGPR with the reasons for its
non-compliance within ten days of its receipt of the Board's
"4' See OGPR PROCEDURES, supra note 297, S 5(3).
342 Id.
33 See id. S 5(1).
' See id. S 5(2). The written recommendations must accompany the
Board's report. See id.
145 See id. Immediately upon completion, the Board must send its report
and recommendations to the entity, complainant, and other participants. See
id. S 5(4).
346 See id. S 5(5). It states that "[t]he entity concerned will, in principle, and
as its own decision, duly follow the recommendations of the Board." Id.
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recommendations.3 47 The Complaint Procedures are silent as to
the circumstances in which the entity may choose not to follow
the Board's recommendations.348
When the Board in its review of a complaint "finds evidence
of misconduct or actions or behavior contrary to the law relating
to the procurement," it must report the information "to the
appropriate enforcement authorities for action.""' The genesis
of this provision is the bilateral complainant mechanisms
350
where a major concern was price discounting.
31
3.5.3. Potential Consequences of the Complaint
Mechanism
Fulfillment of the GPA directive to provide a bid challenge
system s will enable suppliers to challenge tendering procedures
and contract awards, and thus enhance the enforcement of the
GPA. This is particularly true for signatories, such as Japan, that
lack a tradition of bid protest systems. The potential of the GPA-
mechanism, however, will be realized only if suppliers use the
system and the system is fair. The reviews requested by suppliers
must be conducted in a manner that gives participants confidence
that their disputes receive full and fair hearings and are properly
resolved on the merits.3 3
Since the pre-GPA complaint mechanisms have been used only
once in Japan, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions. Nonethe-
less, the import of that one case cannot be ignored. Because
lingering concerns with the case appear to contribute to the
141 See id. Where the complaint involves public works, the entity
concerned has 60 days to provide reasons for non-compliance. See id. "Public
works" refers to procurements of construction services, and design and
consulting services by governmental entities and government-related entities.
See 1994 Public Works Agreement, supra note 314; USTR, 1996 NATIONAL
TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRERS 189-90 (1996).
348 The Procedures include an Express Option, which allows for an
.expedited review of a complaint at the discretion of the Board, if so requested
by the complainant or the procuring entity. See id. § 6.
349 Id. § 5 (7).
350 See, e.g., 1990 Supercomputer Agreement, supra note 284, 5 (ML1)(4.7).
351 See Grier, supra note 2, at 29.
352 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
313 In addition, suppliers may be reluctant to use the new system if there
is a perception that they may be penalized in future procurements by a
procuring entity if they protest a procurement conducted-by that entity.
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disincentive of foreign firms to use complaint mechanisms in
Japan, it must be considered as part of this Article's assessment of
the potential for success of Japan's new complaint mechanism.3"4
In 1992, a U.S. firm, Cray Research, Inc. ("Cray"), participated
in a procurement for a supercomputer conducted by the National
Institute of Fusion Sciences ("NIFS"), which is an entity under the
Ministry of Education. NIFS awarded the contract to a Japanese
supercomputer manufacturer, NEC Corporation ("NEC"). When
NIFS announced the award, Cray resorted to the complaint
mechanism in the 1990 Supercomputer Agreement and filed a
complaint with the Supercomputer Procurement Review Board
("Supercomputer Board")."
Cray sought review of several aspects of the procurement.
First, Cray challenged the NIFS evaluation as unfair, favoring the
winning Japanese system, in particular with regard to its point
allocation and scoring of performance evaluation standards.356
Second, Cray claimed that the abnormal matching of the NEC
proposed system with the comprehensive evaluation standards set
by NIFS raised the question whether NEC had prior information
31 In this Article, treatment of the cornplaint is necessarily brief. A
detailed assessment of the allegations made by the complaining firm, the merits
of the Board's decision, and te criticism surrou eeyond the scope
of this Article.
311 See Letter from Tokyo Aoyama Law Office, Representatives for
Petitioner, Cray Research, Inc., to Supercomputer Procurement Review Board
'Guly 9, 1992) (Petition of Complaint) (copy on file with author); USTR, Press
Statement, Hills Calls for Consultations in Wake of Japanese Supercomputer
Decision (Oct. 8, 1992) [hereinafter USTR's NIFS Statement].
356 See Letter from Tokyo Aoyama Law Office, Representatives for
Petitioner, Cray Research, Inc., to Supercomputer Procurement Review Board,
5 1, at 3-7 Guly 16, 1992) (The Detailed Contents of the Grievances Stated in
the Petition of Complaint Dated July 9, 1992) [hereinafter Cray's Detailed
Petition] (copy on file with author). NIFS used three benchmarks to measure
the performance of the supercomputer of each supplier. See id. On two of
them, NIPS gave Cray and NEC the same score, even though the Cray system
"significantly outperformed" the NEC system. See Letter from John A.
Rollwagen, Cray Research Chairman and CEO, to Barbara Franklin, U.S.
Secretary of Commerce Gune 30, 1992) [hereinafter Rollwagen Letter] (copy on
file with author). Cray complained that NEC executed the third benchmark
on a single processor, even though NIFS was procuring a multi-processor
system. See Cray's Detailed Petition, supra, § 1-5, at 6. Because Cray's system
included sixteen processors and NEC's only two, the Cray system would have
outperformed the NEC system had the evaluation been conducted on all of the
processors; instead the NEC system was awarded additional points based on the
single processor evaluation. See id; Rollwagen Letter, supra.
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on the point allocation.57 Finally, Cray questioned whether the
winning Japanese system could meet all of NIFS's specifications,
particularly the requirements of an external mass storage system
and an automated parallelization function. 5
In reviewing the complaint, the Supercomputer Review Board
followed the process set out in the Supercomputer Agreement,
which is very similar to Japan's GPA mechanism. The review
process included the submission of written explanations and data
by NIFS and Cray, a hearing by the Board in which the interested
parties participated, and the preparation of a written report by the
Board.
359
Based on its review of the complaint, the Supercomputer
Review Board concluded that there were no significant problems
in the conduct of the procurement, 3 ° and that it was "unable to
recognize the validity of Cray's claims." 361  The Board limited
its scope of review to a determination of whether the procure-
ment had been conducted as prescribed by the procedures in the
Supercomputer Agreement.3 2 The Board did not attempt to
... See Cray's Detailed Petition, supra note 356, S 2, at 7-9. For example,
Cray pointed to the fact that with regard to storage time, the NEC proposal
received a perfect score even though NIFS had not disclosed publicly the point
allocation for the comprehensive evaluation standards until the day that bids
were due. See id. at 3, 8. Under the 1990 Agreement, the overall evaluation
of bids must be "conducted in a manner that ensures equal treatment of all
bidders and full transparency." 1990 Supercomputer Agreement, supra note284, § HI(3.7)(1).
... See Cray's Detailed Petition, supra note 356, % 2.2, 3.1, at 8-10;
Rollwagen Letter, supra note 356. Under the Supercomputer Agreement, a
supplier may bid a "paper machine," that is, one that has not been produced
at the time of the bidding, provided that the supplier is able to deliver" the
promised machine by the announced delivery date; if not, "the entire pro-
curement will be subject to rebidding." 1990 Supercomputer Agreement, supra
note 284, S IfI(3.6)(2)(c).
... See Cable 16925 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Wash., D.C. (Oct. 7, 1992) [hereinafter Supercomputer Board
Report] (translating the Supercomputer Review Board Decision) (copy on file
with author).
" See Cable 16926 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of
Commerce (Oct. 14, 1992) [hereinafter Chairman's Statement] (incorporating
Draft Opening Statement of Committee Chairman Tejima, Oct. 7, 1992) (copy
on file with author); Supercomputer Board Report, supra note 359.
36I Chairman's Statement, supra note 360.
362 See id. For example, the Board stated that it would not declare NIFS
benchmarks unacceptable as long as they were not "irrational." Supercomputer
Board Report, supra note 359; Chairman's Statement, supra note 360. Under
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address the merits of the competing supercomputers."
When the Board issued its report, the U.S. government
immediately expressed "serious concerns,"364  noting that the
review process represented "an important test of the Japanese
government's resolve to fully implement the provisions of the
1990 Supercomputer Agreement."36 ' The United States also
expressed concerns with the Board's "extraordinarily narrow
interpretation" of its mandate, and registered its dissatisfaction
with the manner in which NIFS subsequently "conducted
verification procedures in determining that two features promised
by the successful bidder actually were present in the machine
delivered."
366
While the duties of the Supercomputer Review Board do not
include conducting a de novo review of a procurement subject to
a bid challenge, it must review "any aspect of a procurement"
subject to a complaint.367 The Board must "specify whether the
procurement process or award was inconsistent with the intent or
specific provisions" of the Agreement.368 Accordingly, the Board
was obligated to determine whether the procuring entity followed
the required procedures in a manner that ensured selection of the
bid "that best enables [the entity] to perform its mission"369 and
the 1990 Supercomputer Agreement, entities must select benchmarks that are
"representative of the anticipated workload of the entity." 1990 Supercomputer
Agreement, supra note 284, S II(1.5)(2)(c).
363 See Chairman's Statement, supra note 360. The Chairman explained that
the Board "did not make any special investigation of the allegation regarding
the comparative merits of the two systems since that is not part of the role ot
this [Board]." Id.
311 USTR's NIFS Statement, supra note 355.
365 Id.
366 USTR, 1993 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS 153. Japan failed to satisfy either the U.S. government or
Cray Research that NEC had in fact delivered a supercomputer system that met
all of the specifications, as required by the Agreement. See id. In criticizing
the NIFS decision, the U.S. government noted the other options available to
the Review Board, including: (1) overturning the NIFS decision and awarding
the contract to Cray Research; (2) requiring NIFS to start the procurement
process over again; (3) asking suppliers to submit new bids for the procurement;
and (4) re-evaluating the existingbids. See USTR's NIPS Statement, supra note
355.
367 E.g. 1990 Supercomputer Agreement, supra note 284, S 11(2.1).
311 Id. S m11(4.1) (emphasis added).
369 Id. at 1.
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whether the entity considered in its evaluation of bids "technical
excellence, with overall system performance being of fundamental
importance."70 The Board was also required to consider "all the
circumstances surrounding the procurement process or
award," 37 1 including whether the entity evaluated the bids based
on achieving the overall greatest value.37 2
Such determinations raise difficult issues. Boards must
confront such issues if they are to generate confidence that
suppliers' claims will be fully and fairly considered, and will not
be dismissed on narrow procedural grounds.
4. CONCLUSION
Japan's implementation of the GATT Code in 1981 opened a
new era of government procurement in Japan. The new era
continued with bilateral procurement accords and culminated in
the implementation of the GPA, which represents Japan's third
set of international obligations. The latest step in the evolution
of Japan's government procurement system is likely to have a
significant, if less dramatic, effect on Japan's government procure-
ment system than its GATT Code implementation.
The GPA's major implications for Japan are essentially three-
fold: (1) extension of multinational disciplines to services, in
particular public works, which constitute a significant portion of
government procurement budgets; (2) broadening coverage to
procurement by the most important sub-central entities, namely
the forty-seven prefectures and twelve largest cities in Japan; and
(3) creation of a new complaint mechanism.
The GPA covers government procurement of services for the
first time. This fills what had been one of the major "gaps" in
GATT Code coverage. This gap, particularly with respect to
public works, was a major area of bilateral controversy and led to
the negotiation of several bilateral accords.
Moreover, the GPA measurably increases the procurement
opportunities available to foreign suppliers as it extends coverage
to local governments which account for a significant portion of
Japanese government procurement. The implementation of the
370 Id. S 11(3.7)(1).
371 id. s rm(4.).
372 See id. § II(3.4)(1); Grier, supra note 2, at 30, 64 (discussing the
significance of the overI greatest value evaluation method).
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GPA may be as revolutionary for many of the local governments
in Japan as GATT Code implementation was for the central
government fifteen years earlier. Compliance with the GPA
should result in the removal of the more egregious local practices,
namely the use of preferential local qualifications and the
minimum price system. One can hope that as local governments
realize the benefits of more fair, transparent, and competitive
tendering procedures, they will apply those procedures to
procurements outside the GPA.
Furthermore, Japan's adoption of a complaint mechanism that
applies to all procurements covered by the GPA provides a new
opportunity for suppliers to challenge procurements directly.
Suppliers no longer need to rely on their own governments to
raise their concerns with the Japanese government. Having
established the system-wide mechanism, however, Japan must now
ensure that the new system is implemented in a manner that will
engender in suppliers the confidence that their complaints will be
given a meaningful review and that they will not be subject to any
form of retaliation if they use the mechanism. The first caution
arises from Japan's very limited experience with complaint
mechanisms and the perception that in the only complaint heard
to date the Procurement Review Board defined its role too
narrowly. The second relates to cultural tradition that discourage
firms from challenging government decisions. The realization of
the potential of the complaint mechanism will depend upon the
Japanese government overcoming both hurdles.
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